NB: THIS TRANSCRIPT WAS TYPED FROM A TRANSCRIPTION UNIT RECORDING AND NOT COPIED FROM AN ORIGINAL SCRIPT: BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF MIS-HEARING AND THE DIFFICULTY, IN SOME CASES OF IDENTIFYING INDIVIDUAL SPEAKERS, THE BBC CANNOT VOUCH FOR ITS ACCURACY.
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PANORAMA
FRONTLINE BRITAIN
RECORDED FROM TRANSMISSION: BBC-1 DATE: 16:03:03
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ANDY DAVIES: As Britain prepares for war in Iraq the country faces its greatest threat yet from Islamist terrorists. Panorama has learnt from intelligence sources that hundreds of extremists linked to Al-Qaeda are in the UK and the police believe an attack is almost inevitable. Security levels are high but the intelligence agencies are struggling. They were told a decade ago about this threat but for years they did little to tackle the danger. As a result, they've hardly any undercover agents within the terror cells. Tonight the story of the secret intelligence war against Al-Qaeda inside a country living for the very first time in the shadow of suicide terrorism.
Over the last few months few months I've been speaking to senior intelligence sources about the terrorist threat in Britain. They estimate that the number of Al-Qaeda sympathisers who are in this country and who pose a significant threat is in the low hundreds. There are significant elements of Al-Qaeda out there, they say, who are keen to pull off what they call 'spectaculars'. As one security source put it: "The threat is high and war with Iraq will only increase that threat."
If and when it comes the attack could have devastating consequences. But would we be prepared to deal with them? Tonight we also investigate the high sensitive issue of what the government is planning in the event of a catastrophic attack. We uncover serious shortcomings.
ERIC CLARK: If we remain under equipped, large numbers of the public could be placed at risk.
PETER WILLDRIDGE: I fear that we are sleepwalking our way towards a disaster.
DAVIES: The government faces a real dilemma. How to guard against this increasing threat without undermining our way of life.
Reconstruction
Five weeks ago an MI5 informant believed to be linked to Algerian extremists contacted his handlers. He picked up some crucial information he said from one of his contacts. A group of Al-Qaeda operatives had entered Britain and they were planning a major attack. Their target – a passenger jet to be taken out near Heathrow with a surface to air missile. The attack, he said, was imminent. The intelligence appeared to tie in with intercepts being picked up at the eavesdropping centre at GCHQ in Cheltenham. Later that evening, an officer from MI5's G Branch, it's international terrorism section, took the tip off to Scotland Yard. Security chiefs were called in for a series of meetings over the weekend. On Monday morning a meeting of Cobra, the Government's national crisis group, was convened at the Cabinet Office. The Prime Minister, the Home Secretary and representatives of the three security services – MI5, MI6 and GCHQ – were all present. They had a crucial decision to make, to shut down one of the word's busiest airports or bring in the army. At 6 o'clock the following morning the tanks rolled in to Heathrow. An SAS unit was placed on standby. For five days the army, the police and the intelligence agencies kept Heathrow under intense scrutiny but the attack never materialised.
ANDY DAVIES
The intelligence agencies say the case of Heathrow is still active, but the tip off, it appears, had been a dud. As for the response, bringing in the tanks, according to one senior policeman involved, it had been a major overreaction. But the affair epitomised one thing, the security services are extremely nervous right now about what Al-Qaeda is planning for Britain. This time a surface to air missile attack had been anticipated.
Tokyo, 1995
But the security services fear Al-Qaeda may also opt for less conventional terrorism, chemical, biological or nuclear, so called CBRN warfare. The attack on the Tokyo underground eight years ago is precisely the sort of scenario they're worried about. These scenes were filmed shortly after members of a Japanese cult released the lethal nerve gas sarin onto five carriages on the subway. It killed 12 people, caused over 3,000 casualties and panicked a whole nation. A similar attack at Heathrow could be equally destructive with thousands of people in urgent need of treatment.
Decontamination Exercise
Decontaminating the skin of any poisonous agents would be the first priority. Health workers around the country now have 360 specially designed units for this, as well as 7,000 protective suits. If the attack happened at Heathrow, St Peter's Hospital in Chertsey would be one of the first hospitals to receive patients. It's just ten miles away from the airport. They'd be under the care of John Belstead who is in charge of their emergency planning programme.
JOHN BELSTEAD
This is the decontamination room and it's a very small room, waterproof floor. We've got a waterproof trolley for anybody who needs washing off. It's not state of the art but we do have one and a lot of places don’t have one at all.
DAVIES: Down the corridor are the government's new protective suits which the A&E team would grab in the event of an attack. Their most crucial bit of kit, however, is missing.
And I thought every hospital has a mobile decontamination unit.
JOHN BELSTEAD
A & E Consultant
Ashford and St Peter's Hospital Trust
We have a tent which is coming which we will be able to put outside in the ambulance entrance to wash people down if there's more than just one.
DAVIES: It's coming!?
BELSTEAD: It's coming.
DAVIES: Has everyone been trained in CBR decontamination?
BELSTEAD: No, we're about to embark on the training for this. What we've done as an interim is I've produced a manual.
DAVIES: So it's.. dirty bomb goes off.
BELSTEAD: Yes.
DAVIES: Hospital is inundated. You guys are grabbing your manuals, reading through the manuals trying to work out how to use these suits.
BELSTEAD: That is the case, yes.
DAVIES: These are the suits. There are problems, aren't there. They're leaking. Is that right?
BELSTEAD: Yes, we've had a report that there's been a leak around the seam in the toes here.
DAVIES: It doesn't exactly inspire confidence and yet St Peter's is well ahead of the game. In a recent government survey it was rated "the best prepared hospital in the country to deal with a major incident".
Your suits leak.
BELSTEAD: Yes.
DAVIES: Hardly any of your staff have been trained how to use this equipment.
BELSTEAD: Yes.
DAVIES: You haven't yet got the mobile decontamination unit that you need.
BELSTEAD: That's right.
DAVIES: And you are considered one of the best prepared hospitals in the country.
BELSTEAD: So I'm told.
DAVIES: This is not an ideal situation, is it.
BELSTEAD: It's not an ideal situation.
DAVIES: It is now a year and a half since September 11th. Britain's official response to the events of that day began at 5 o'clock in the afternoon. The Prime Minister called in the heads of the intelligence agencies for a crisis meeting. The question to them all was simply "Are we safe in Britain?". This was the moment the government decided it had to do everything to stop a similar attack on the UK. Britain was at war with Al-Qaeda.
Reconstruction
12th September 2001
The following morning the country's intelligence chiefs assembled at RAF Brize Norton. Sir Richard Dearlove - or 'C' as the Head of MI6 is known – joined Sir Frances Richards from GCHQ and the then Deputy Director General of MI5 – Eliza Manningham-Buller. They were to fly immediately to Washington for a series of meetings with the CIA and FBI. The mission to Washington was more than just an expression of solidarity. The British wanted to know why the Americans had failed to predict September 11th and, crucially, whether we had the same deficiencies in the UK. They discovered the answer to that question soon enough. Three months later, in fact, when a British man boarded a flight from Paris to Miami and tried to blow the plane out of the sky. He was arrested after passengers and crew overpowered him. They'd seen him trying to light a fuse protruding from his shoe. That's where he'd hidden his explosives. The shoe-bomber Richard Reid, a British man who wanted to kill for Al-Qaeda. During his trial they reproduced the bomb he'd taken on board American Airlines flight 63. Richard Reid grew up in London. He converted to Islam and spent much of his time at a mosque in Brixton. The face of Richard Reid was deeply unsettling for British intelligence. I asked one security source what the mood in his office was like the day after Reid was caught, and he replied simply: "Not good." Reid was a major terrorist, but before his arrest none of the agencies had ever heard about him, and this meant that there were huge gaps. MI5 and Special Branch simply didn't have enough people on the ground mixing with the likes of Richard Reid.
British Intelligence Services
Surveillance video
OFFICER: The tailgate is down like a step, so you step up from the ground onto the tailgate and is now at the back of a van with the shutter open. Whistle Two.
DAVIES: It wasn't that British intelligence lacked the guile or expertise to pick up security threats like Richard Reid. This is the agency's own film of an operation following an IRA quartermaster in London. It was obtained by BBC Northern Ireland.
OFFICER: Whistle Two off the ramp, still with the shutter of the van wide open and Whistle Two is off ahead of the vehicle. XXX is held at the rear. If someone was to walk in they may have a look in.
DAVIES: Throughout the 80s and 90s MI5 and Special Branch proved highly effective at identifying, monitoring and ultimately infiltrating Irish Republican terror cells. Surveillance operations could last for months before the Antiterrorist Squad finally picked their moment to move in. At the same time as they were focusing on the IRA, we now know that the Security Services were also receiving intelligence about another serious terrorist threat. At first it appeared to be another country's problem.
Paris, 1995
Once again, at the peak of the rush hour in the heart of Paris, the panic and confusion of a no-warning terrorist attack. The French know all about Islamist extremism. It became a major issue for them eight years ago.
Police were everywhere, searching and watching, trying hard to show France wouldn't bow to terror.
But the French government fears the danger of further attacks remains.
DAVIES: Throughout the mid 90s prompted by a civil war in their own country, Algerian extremists took their battle to cities across France. At the same time the French noticed that these groups were establishing support networks in London. So the police in Paris began issuing clear warnings to their counterparts at Scotland Yard.
Did the French say to you that these Algerian groups in London posed a potential terrorist threat to the UK?
JOHN HOWLEY
Head of Special Branch
Metropolitan Police, 1992-96
Yes, that was the meaning of what they were saying: "Be aware that in due course this is the sort of terrorism that will affect you and you should be paying attention."
DAVIES: That was what year?
HOWLEY: That would have been around sort of 1993 to 96. What you must remember is that at that time Irish Republican terrorism was still the number one focus of our priorities in London.
DAVIES: Many in France believe the British didn't head the warnings because of a basic intelligence failure. In their view the British simply didn't understand the French analysis that radical Islam was extending beyond the Middle East.
Dr OLIVIER ROY
Expert in Islamic Politics
The analysis in France was that we are not witnessing so much as spill-over of the Middle Eastern conflicts from Middle East into Western Europe. But we are witnessing a true process of radicalisation among western Muslims who are living in the West and who have a Western agenda and this is quite different.
DAVIES: The only known MI5 agent who was ever tasked to infiltrate extreme Muslim groups in London in this period, is this Algerian exile. Radar Hussein came to Britain 9 years ago with connections to French intelligence he walked into Scotland Yard one day and offered to spy for Special Branch. Hussein worked for both the police and MI5 for about a year informing on the activities of Abu Hamza, then a little known radical cleric based at Finsbury Park Mosque in London.
REDA HASSAINE
British Intelligence Services
1998-2000
They wanted to know about all what's going on around this mosque, the people who are around him, the people who are surrounding him, the people who are protecting him, how the mosque is, I did the sketch of the mosque, how it is, room by room, office by office, entrance by entrance and all this kind of stuff.
DAVIES: Hussein's cover was eventually blown and his work as an agent terminated. He claims he warned his old paymasters that people from Britain were training in Al-Qaeda camps.
HASSAINE: These people are going to Afghanistan to train and to come back to kill here. When I say 'here' I don’t know if it's in London or in New York, or in Washington. Okay?
DAVIES: You were telling MI5 this?
HUSSEIN: Yeah.
DAVIES: And what was their response?
HUSSEIN: There's no… no response at all.
ANDY DAVIES
I've been told that Special Branch wanted to bug Finsbury Park Mosque about 6 years ago, but as one police source put it: "There just wasn't the appetite for it at government level." The consensus within intelligence circles is that they should have been scrutinising extreme Islamist groups far more closely before September 11th. And now they're struggling in terms of being able to penetrate any of these groups. They know the terrorists are out there but they've little idea of what they're planning.
Professor RICHARD ALDRICH
Intelligence and National
Security Journal
I think the British were sceptical of some French intelligence reports because French intelligence has a violent past in Algeria and France has behaved in an entirely unregulated way in terms of its counterterrorist intelligence against the Algerians. I think those warnings were thought to reflect that very difficult relationship with the Algerians rather than being precise information about what might happen in London.
Mansion House
2002
DAVIES: Deciding how open to be about a counterterrorism strategy demands careful judgment. The conundrum faced by any government in this situation is how do you prepare for a possible terror attack without causing mass panic?
TONY BLAIR: Barely a day goes by without some new piece of intelligence coming via our Security Services about a threat to UK interests. The government has to ensure that we take whatever security measures we can, consistent with the desire of people to live normal lives.
DAVIES: The government is prepared to acknowledge the threat, but not so willing to discuss the consequences. It's plans in the event of an attack are not open to the public, but we've pieced together a scenario featuring a likely response to one type of attack which we know the government is planning for.
If a so-called dirty bomb exploded in the city of London there could be a significant release of radioactive material. Casualties might be high with thousands of those who survive the explosion contaminated. Specially trained police units would then move in, take overall control and cordon off the immediate area, the so-called hot zone. Fire fighters clad in gas-tight suits would then bring the casualties out to a warm zone for decontamination. They'd be hosed down essentially, a job done principally by the ambulance service. The underground stations within the effected area would be immediately sealed off. A network of through roads would then be created to funnel traffic directly onto the M25 and away from the capital as the area is evacuated. Temporary mortuaries would then be established by the district coroner. This at least is the theory.
It's very difficult to get any details on this from the government, but we've obtained these confidential documents from the cabinet office which show that only last summer they've identified serious problems with the plans for mass evacuation in the event of an attack. These are some of the findings. "Critical to successful evacuation will be communications but there are currently severe weaknesses. For the residential population there is no strategy for advanced communication in the event of evacuation. Many (if not most) transport locations that will need to be used for evacuation are ill-suited to coping with large crowds. There are no plans for rapid evacuation of hospitals." And overall, the report says: "The framework plans developed are effectively untested." The issue of mass evacuation is a matter of real concern for the country's 500 local emergency planners. From their standby control rooms across the country they'd have to take care of the thousands who might be affected by an attack. Until he retired last month Peter Willdridge was in charge of emergency planning in Buckinghamshire, a key area of evacuation for London. The only guidance he'd had from the government he said since September 11th was a document on decontamination and a letter telling him his grant would be cut.
PETER WILLDRIDGE
Chief Emergency Planner
Buckinghamshire, 1991-2003
On television day in day out we hear from ministers that this is the single biggest threat facing the country. Indeed we have to go to war on the basis of this threat facing us. And yet when we ask why our emergency planning grant has been cut by 10% since September 11th, and could they justify this on a threat assessment they give us the following reply: "You asked for a description (this is from the Cabinet Office) You asked for a description of the threat facing this country, I've obtained the following from the Home Office Terrorism and Protection Unit. We know of no specific evidence of a CBRN threat to the United Kingdom from Al-Qaeda or similar associated terrorists." Well how can we operate when we've got one half of the country being told there's a threat, and we as professionals are being told that there is no threat.
DAVIES: The last major open exercise the government organised to simulate a terrorist attack happened before September 11th, 3 years ago in West London. Since then much has been done to improve the emergency services ability to respond to a CBRN attack. The police for instance now have 2000 officers specially trained and health workers have access to a stock pile of vaccines in the event of an outbreak of smallpox. But all rely heavily on the fire-fighters and they're in trouble. Last February the government promised them fifty-three million pounds of essential new CBRN equipment but none of it seems to have arrived. We've checked with services in Essex, Hampshire, New Castle, Wales and Scotland and it's the same story, no such new equipment. They're still having to rely on their old stock of gas-tight suits which currently is two per fire engine. In North Yorkshire the fire service has to cover two of the country's most sensitive military sites – Menwith Hill and Flyingdales.
Since September 11th, in your particular region, has anything actually changed on the ground?
ERIC CLARK
Chief Fire Officer
North Yorks Fire Service
In terms of the equipment which we require to deal with the worst case planning scenario the answer has to be no.
DAVIES: There's no new equipment?
CLARK: There's no new equipment - correct.
DAVIES: No new suits?
CLARK: No new suits.
DAVIES: No new decontamination units?
CLARK: Nothing.
DAVIES: As a member of the public I find that staggering.
CLARK: I find it disappointing too.
DAVIES: But if there was a dirty bomb incident in this region today, you wouldn't be in a position to cater for mass decontamination?
CLARK: Absolutely not.
DAVIES: How important is this equipment for the emergency services?
JOHN DENHAM MP
Home Office Minister
It's a very important part of the planning for the emergency services. Some of the purchase of protective equipment of course began before September 11th. It was part of the pre-existing plans because these things didn't hit us entirely on September 11th and we're continuing to build up our capacity to respond.
DAVIES: One chief fire officer has told us that since September 11th he hasn't received one new piece of equipment and that nothing has changed on the ground. Is that acceptable, given the nature of the threat?
DENHAM: It would depend a bit on the position of the individual fire authority I imagine because…
DAVIES: Yes or no? I'm just asking you, is that acceptable that he hasn't received any new equipment since September 11th?
DENHAM: What I would like to do is to go to that fire authority, find out what their equipment position is….
DAVIES: They haven't got any new equipment. That's.. I'm telling you, that's the position.
DENHAM: No, to find out what existing equipment they had because it is not new for fire authorities to have gas-proof equipment, and so without knowing more about that individual fire authority I wouldn't want to answer. What I can answer for is….
DAVIES: Minister, with respect, you haven't answered my question. I asked you do you think that is acceptable?
DENHAM: What equipment do they already have?
DAVIES: They have 200 gas-tight suits, they need 600.
DENHAM: Well they have 200 gas-tight suits, that's a fairly substantial amount of equipment. We currently have a procurement process underway to get additional gas-tight suits. Clearly what we are doing.. clearly what we are doing is prioritising the areas that get the suits and that depends on the nature of the area and the risk. I couldn't possibly answer for each individual fire authority without you letting me know ahead of the interview that you wanted to ask questions about it and to make an assessment of it. I am confident though that there is a good process underway with the fire authorities in identifying what is necessary, procuring the equipment and training staff.
DAVIES: So North Yorkshire's fire fighters continue to train with their old quota of gas-tight suits. The lack of new equipment severely restricts the scale of their response to any attack. And what this means for the public is that if there were a major attack, these key emergency workers might not be able to help.
If there was a dirty bomb attack lets say on one of the military bases in the area here, would you send your offices into that situation with the current equipment?
ERIC CLARK
Chief Fire Officer
North Yorks Fire Service
I would have some difficulty in being able to justify exposing fire fighters with their current levels of equipment very close to the areas concerned. We do not currently have the equipment that would be necessary to deal with that worst case incident. We do not have the equipment.
DAVIES; So people are going to die unnecessarily.
CLARK: Well it depends on the levels of exposure, but that is a possibility, a distinct possibility.
DAVIES: The government has a senior figure in charge of the country's contingency planning, Sir David Omand. But it took them 9 months after September 11th to appoint him. Neither he nor the Home Secretary David Blunket would be interviewed for Panorama.
PETER WILLDRIDGE
Chief Emergency Planner
Buckinghamshire, 1991-2003
It's easy to blame the government for all the problems that occur in society, but this is the single most important thing they have to do which is first and foremost they have to protect the public, and that's what we've got a government for, and I just think it is outrageous that we're in a position where nobody is in control of a major emergency like this through all its phases. I think it's a disgrace.
DAVIES: They would point to Sir David Omand who is the Intelligence and Security coordinator.
WILLDRIDGE: But let's hear from him, let's see what he says and lets see some action on the ground. There is no sense of urgency when we're faced with this threat. I fear that we're sleepwalking our way towards a disaster.
DAVIES: One local emergency planner has said to us: "Let's see some action on the ground. I fear that we are sleepwalking our way towards a disaster." It feels a bit like we're sleepwalking at the moment, doesn't it.
JOHN DENHAM MP
Home Office Minister
No, it doesn't, and I find it extraordinary that an emergency planner should say that, with the contacts that they will have had with the police, with the fire brigade, with the ambulance service, with what they will know about what they're meant to be preparing for, about how they should be organised, about the equipment that's being procured, about the training that's underway for ambulance staff, for police officers, for fire fighters, it is an extraordinary statement to make and I don’t agree with it.
DAVIES: If the intelligence agencies failed to take the threat of Islamist extremism seriously in the 1990s then events over the last year and a half have certainly sharpened their focus. The security services now believe that there are several hundred Al-Qaeda sympathisers in the UK, and last March the Head of Special Branch's E Squad wanted to see just how easy it could be for them to arm themselves. One morning he sent his assistant out to the shops to buy a bomb. First the two of them had trawled the internet and found nearly 300 websites offering details on how to make home made explosives. The detective then headed to a number of basic grocery, chemist and hardware shops all within half a mile of Scotland Yard. Armed with the appropriate materials she returned to the office. It had taken her 23 minutes. The bomb squad then took a look a the materials and verified that the mix was lethal. To find the recipe and buy the ingredients for their bomb it had taken Special Branch a total of just one hour and eight minutes. The likely targets for such an attack are classed by the intelligence agencies as prestige or postcard locations, like the Tower of London for instance, or the Houses of Parliament. But they talk also about soft targets, like the Sari Nightclub in Bali which was bombed five months ago. The attack on the club killed over 200 people including 26 Britons. It was a brutal reminder of how broadly Al-Qaeda chooses to spread its targets, and how much work the intelligence agencies need to do to stay ahead of the terror squads.
Professor RICHARD ALDRICH
Intelligence and National
Security Journal
I've rarely seen the intelligence services so busy or indeed so stretched. Lots of retired people being brought back into service, people being required to work round the clock. What we really see is something which looks like a two stroke lawn mower engine, the down sized British intelligence community after the Cold War having to run at absolutely full speed, having to do the work of a V8 engine, and my concern is that something is going to break.
[ Spooks ]
"Spooks"
BBC One, 2002
Officially we're the Security Services, unofficially we prefer MI5 or simply 5. Our main function, to protect Britain's national security.
DAVIES: The BBC drama 'Spooks' has proved to be the most effective recruitment ad. the Security Services has ever had, but the real spooks, both MI5 and the Foreign Secret Service MI6 are desperately short of staff, in particular people who can speak Arabic. For the very first time MI6 or the Secret Intelligence Service as it's officially known, has gone on line to double its intake of intelligence branch officers. And over at Scotland Yard, Special Branch are now paying far more attention to the issue of how terrorists fund themselves. As one senior officer put it, monitoring a bank account is as important now as bugging a phone conversation. Staff levels at the branch have increased by 60% since September 11th.
British Intelligence Services
Surveillance video
OFFICER: Have lost some XXX now who has walked to the rear of the vehicle towards the exits are like a loss of both ??
DAVIES: But as they continue to boost their staffing levels, Britain's intelligence agencies realise there is another more fundamental issue which they need urgently to address. Their success in the 90s against active service units of the IRA owed much to their extensive network of undercover agents and informants.
OFFICER: Whistle Two is now talking to a member of staff. He's now called XX go over.
DAVIES: The Security Services have nothing like the same levels of penetration within radical Muslim groups, and their attempts to catch up have seemed a little clumsy. Since September 11th unprecedented numbers of young Muslims have reported approaches from intelligence officers looking for informants.
MASSOUD SHADJAREH
Islamic Human Rights Commission
What I'm concerned is, people are being threatened, people are being given the right of staying here or being deported, the right of freedom or being put in gaol as a carrot and stick to force them to become an agent.
DAVIES: This printing press is preparing the fourth run of an extraordinary leaflet circulating in Britain's Muslim communities. In many ways it symbolises just how desperate the agencies are to recruit informants. If approached by British Intelligence it says: "There is no obligation for you to work as an MI5 agent. State to the MI5 officer that your solicitors will contact them. Do make sure that you obtain their name(s) and telephone number(s) and do not think that MI5 officers are stupid."
SHADJAREH: I see it as a desperate act by people who are being forced to come up with more information than they have and they don’t know where to begin.
DAVIES: They've got to start somewhere.
SHADJAREH: Yes, but I think by this approach is counterproductive because it's creating.. you see you can't really get information from any community if you alienate yourselves from that community. And what this heavy handed approach does, definitely is alienating the security from the community, and that's the worst thing that could happen as regard us gathering intelligence.
JOHN HOWLEY
Head of Special Branch
Metropolitan Police, 1992-96
It has an element of panic about it I think. It seems to show that there was great pressure to achieve something that, with hindsight, should have been achieved some years previously.
British Intelligence Services
Surveillance video
DAVIES: For the intelligence agencies to achieve the same levels of penetration among Islamist terrorists they had with the IRA may never prove possible. The nature of the threat has changed significantly as must the tactics to counter it. Unlike IRA quartermasters, IRA terrorists don’t give warnings, and they're prepared to die while delivering their bombs.
Onto the footway and left up towards the bridge. Now along the control.
Professor RICHARD ALDRICH
Intelligence and National
Security Journal
Traditionally in the game we've been used to in Northern Ireland is penetrate and survey, play the game over a long period of time, gather information. Now this has changed completely. The threat of catastrophic terrorism, suicide terrorism requires these people to be arrested immediately and that brings the intelligence flow to a stop.
"Protect and Survive"
Government Information Film, 1976
After a nuclear attack you may not be able to use your lavatory because there might not be enough water to flush it or the whole system might be damaged. So start….
DAVIES: In the old days when we were threatened with disaster the government inundated us with information and advice. But now they've gone to the opposite extreme.
This is about the only place you can get information, it's the government's contingency website called 'UK Resilience'. Obviously you've got to be computer literate to get here in the first place, but even when you have accessed this site, the only concrete advice on how to prepare for a terrorist act seems to come from other countries.
PETER WILLDRIDGE
Chief Emergency Planner
Buckinghamshire, 1991-2003
There are certain good things to do and you could list them, but Nobody's told the public this. Why aren't they being told. Is it because the government don’t want to alarm people? In my view they should be alarmed. They should be told there is a problem. This is what you will do and these are the best actions to take. I just cannot understand why this isn't being handled nationally.
DAVIES: Do you know what to do in the event of a terror attack because I don’t and I don’t think many of the public do.
JOHN DENHAM MP
Home Office Minister
No, but I know that there would be advice broadcasts through arrangements which were well established with broadcasters through local radio and through television, to me, to you, to everybody else about what to do under the circumstances. What we have concentrated on is working with broadcast networks to ensure that we've got the information and we can put it out in the most appropriate form.
DAVIES: In the meantime the government is pursuing its contingency plans to contain the damage in the event of any attack. This exercise was held in Southern Europe. London will stage a similar event later this month. But the chilling message facing us all is that if we're to take the intelligence agencies' assessment at face value, then there are several hundred Al-Qaeda sympathisers based in Britain, and by that they mean activists who trained in the camps in Afghanistan. As one officers put it: "Unless there is more penetration within these groups there is a strong sense of inevitability that something will get through."
On the surface the government is understandably concerned not to appear alarmist. It doesn't want to disrupt our lives. But it can be under no illusion of the size of the task ahead if it's to face up to the threat from Al-Qaeda here in frontline Britain.
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www.bbc.co.uk/panorama
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