Review Articles

BRINGING IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER

Liberalism, Legitimacy, and the United Nations

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Boutros Boutros-Ghali. *Agenda for Peace*, 2d ed. New York: United Nations, 1995, 159 pp.

Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighborhood.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, 410 pp.

Gareth Evans. *Cooperating for Peace.* St. Leonards, Australia: Unwin and Hyman, 1993, 224 pp.

Report of the Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations. *The United Nations in Its Second Half-Century.* New York: Ford Foundation, 1995, 53 pp.

THE end of the cold war and the attendant security vacuum unleashed a flurry of intellectual activity, including numerous commissions, that reflected on the world that was being left behind and the world that should be created in its place. The reports under review in this article are among the best and most influential of the lot, and they have two defining qualities. The first is the attempt to capitalize on the post–cold war moment to escape the pessimism of realism and to envision an international order secured without the threat of force. These reports share the belief that multilateralism must supplant the security practices that defined the cold war, that the language of assurance must replace the language of deterrence, and that states should build institutions rather than militaries. Second, these reports advocate strengthen-

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ing the role of the United Nations in security politics. The UN was already flexing its long-atrophying muscles at the close of the cold war as it helped many protracted regional and domestic conflicts to wind down, served as a central player during the Gulf War, and undertook numerous peacekeeping operations of tremendous complexity, scope, and size. The international body, once relegated to the back seat in security matters, had become the darling of the hour, a development these reports want to see become permanent rather than transitory. The reports discussed here wax eloquent about the transformational possibilities for global politics and about the role of the UN as the prospective global deliverer.

The reports have been overtaken by events, however. They began their inquiries during the optimistic period of the early 1990s but began publishing their findings just as the UN was suffering a series of setbacks, most notably in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia. While the commissions were painting a progressive shift in global politics and advocating a central role for the UN in security affairs, many parts of the world where the UN was present were descending into chaos if not hell—and arguably with the assistance of the UN. Furthermore, states demonstrated through their pocketbook an unwillingness to see a strengthened UN. Consequently, the news conferences announcing publication of the findings of the various commissions were greeted with little enthusiasm and much cynicism. Their reception symbolized the UN's hard times.

Arguably few international relations scholars were surprised by this turn of events. The UN has long labored under theoretical obscurity because of the general view that it is a bit player, first, on the global scene and, second, in terms of the central research questions of the discipline.[1] Realists and institutionalists largely agree on the false promise of the UN. Neorealists view institutions as permissive and subservient to power politics and therefore dismiss a role for the UN in global security because it lacks enforcement mechanisms that are independent of state interests. Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*, the bible of neorealism, speaks volumes with its near silence on the UN;[2] and the UN's post–cold war activities have elicited strong reaction from prominent neorealists, but usually to bury them and not to praise them.[3] Policymakers have repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to weave grand dreams of a global order secured through institutions, but these dreams have invariably been shattered by the timeless realities of state interests.

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[1] For the rise and decline of the study of international organizations before the end of the cold war, see J. Martin Rochester, "The Rise and Fall of International Organization as a Field of Study," *International Organization* 40 (Autumn 1986); and Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie, "International Organization: A State of the Art on the Art of the State," *International Organization* 40 (Autumn 1986).

[2] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 42, 164. Waltz's lone comment was to reject from consideration any possible role for the UN as a system regulator or in a collective security system because it simply reflects state interests.

Although these reports draw on many institutionalist insights, few neoliberal institutionalists have examined the UN's potential contribution to international security. Perhaps for good reason. The conditions under which they posit that institutions "matter"—when actors have convergent interests and desire to establish norms to overcome collective action and coordination problems—are not present when it comes to the UN and the area of security. During the cold war the great powers rarely turned to the UN as a forum for dispute settlement (except for some peacekeeping episodes), and when they did have convergent security interests they avoided the UN in favor of institutional arrangements that they could more readily control. That the major powers turned to the UN after the cold war reflects that, albeit temporarily, they had converging interests.[4] But the UN's recent decline suggests either that those converging interests have now diverged or that the major powers have found other institutional arrangements to further their security. While neoliberals have broadened their empirical scope to include security, they know better than to stake their credentials or their theories on the UN. Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism then are in league in their dismissal of the UN, sharing as they do the general belief that international order is founded on force coupled with institutional restraints that are supported by a convergence of state interests.

But the reports under review offer an additional message—that international order is produced not only by force coupled with institutional aids but also by legitimacy. Read in this way, these commissions provide a blueprint for how the post–cold war order should be built. To be sure, these reports pay lip service to handing the UN a standing army and a central role in a collective security system, and they insist that the UN be invested with new policy instruments to strengthen its role in conflict resolution. Certainly, if one judges these commissions by whether their proposals have been implemented, then they have failed. But beyond their languishing recommendations, these commissions offer a series of discursive moves and rhetorical arguments about what constitutes legitimate state action and a legitimate international order. Because these reports were looking to the international order that would succeed the cold war, they focus on the constitutive foundations of global politics, how the new international order would be legitimated, what its specific content should be, and how the recalcitrant might come to accept these principles. On such issues, these commissions are suggesting, the UN should occupy a central position.

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[3] John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19 (Winter 1994–95).

[4] See Isabelle Desmartis, Julie Fournier, and Charles Thumerelle, "The United Nations at Fifty: Regime Theory and Collective Security," *International Journal* 50 (Winter 1994–95); James Schear, "Global Institutions in a Cooperative Order: Does the United Nations Fit In?" in Janne Nolan, ed., *Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the Twenty-first Century* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994); and Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Between a New World Order and Norms: Explaining the Re-Emergence of the United Nations in World Politics," in Keith Krause and Michael Williams, eds., *Critical Approaches to International Security* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

Three issues stand out. First, the international order valorized in these reports is a liberal order. These reports are informed by a distinctly liberal worldview and recommend a strengthened UN that can facilitate such an outcome. This raises the second issue: legitimacy in global politics. In a series of intriguing observations and hypotheses concerning the legitimation process in global politics at this historical moment, they remind international relations scholars of the potential importance of the concept of legitimacy, a concept that once found a central place in the works of the classical realists but that has fallen out of favor in recent decades.[5] The concept appears in various guises in these reports in terms of (1) how all international orders must be legitimated if they are to have any staying power; (2) how the legitimation principles of a particular order can shape state practices; and (3) how the UN can be the site for the legitimation of a particular order and for holding states accountable to its norms. The UN, they suggest, can shape state practices by establishing, articulating, and transmitting norms that define acceptable and proper state behavior. Third, these commissions understand that not all actors will find this vision attractive or attainable. Hence, they envision the UN as an agent of normative integration that can increase the number of actors who identify with and uphold the values of a liberal international order. This essay is organized according to these three central themes.

OVERVIEW OF FOUR COMMISSIONS

Some background information about the central orientations of these reports is in order. Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* was the first to appear and is the cornerstone of the other documents under review. Undertaken at the request of a Security Council that was reeling from the growing demands placed on its agenda, *Agenda for Peace* was drafted by various longtime UN hands (including James Sutterlin, now in residence at Yale University) to fashion the role of the United Nations in the post–cold war order. *Agenda for Peace* immediately became the subject of controversy and vigorous debate. Third World states worried that Boutros-Ghali's vision handed more power to a Security Council that was controlled by the great powers, which, in turn, might threaten their sovereignty. In turn, the great powers—that is, the permanent members of the Security Council—feared that a strengthened UN might reduce their autonomy and power. Notwithstanding these reservations, the absence of any other blueprint on the security agenda guaranteed that *Agenda for Peace* would shape the debate on the post–cold war order. And indeed at the UN and in capitals throughout the world, member states debated its various proposals and its call for a revitalized UN.

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[5] See Thomas Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy among Nations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). As Franck writes, "The international system's weakness . . . is its peculiar strength as a laboratory for those seeking to isolate the legitimacy factor" (p. 20). For past statements on legitimacy in international politics, see Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964); and E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964). For contemporary treatments,

Many of its specific proposals were not warmly received, notably for a standing UN army; and others that had been discussed initially, notably for a greater role in peace enforcement, have now been discarded because of recent setbacks. Nevertheless, its broad conceptualization of security and the future international order continues to inform the thinking of many policymakers. Specifically, *Agenda for Peace* suggests that (1) the threat of domestic insecurity is a legitimate concern of the UN because it has the potential to undermine regional security and any semblance of a cosmopolitan sensibility; and that (2) conflict has a life cycle, from preventive measures to peacekeeping and peace enforcement to postconflict nation building. This highly provocative and far-reaching document is testimony not only to its times and the UN's now departed secretary-general but also to a particular moment in world politics. That Boutros-Ghali's vision exceeded what member states were ready to accept was generally conceded in his *Addendum to the Agenda for Peace*: gone are the more ambitious proposals such as a standing army under the direction of the secretary-general and ever present is the notion that the UN will have to delegate tasks and responsibilities to other state and nonstate actors and learn to work with them as it attempts to fulfill its increasingly modest security agenda.

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see Mlada Bukavowsky, "American Identity and Neutral Rights from Independence to the War of 1812," *International Organization* 51 (Spring 1997); J. S. Barkins and B. Cronin, "The State and the Nation," *International Organization* 48 (Winter 1994); Kratochwil and Ruggie (fn.1); and Helen Milner, "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations," *Review of International Studies* 17 (January 1991), 74. The "English School" has also been attentive to the legitimacy of international orders. See Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society* (New York: Routledge, 1992).

Gareth Evans's *Cooperating for Peace* represents another synthetic statement on the role of the UN and regional organizations in shaping the face of security and countering the new security threats. Evans, Australia's foreign minister, desired to weigh in on the post–cold war security debates and timed the publication of the book to coincide with the opening of the 1993 General Assembly. Written with considerable input from scholars at Australian National University, the blue book was well received and quickly viewed as a necessary companion to *Agenda for Peace*.[6] Evans is most concerned with the new security threats that emanate from domestic rather than from traditional interstate conflicts, and he offers a set of measured categories—peace building, peace maintenance, peace restoration, and peace enforcement—to meet the severity of the conflict. His proposed solution, cooperative security, reflects the attempt to find a middle ground between the concepts of common and collective security, which, in his view, are too focused on military solutions, and the concept of comprehensive security, which is, well, too comprehensive to be of much value to policymakers.[7] Attached to these concepts are a series of proposals—including a greater use of sanctions, the establishment of new peacekeeping training centers, and expanded roles for civilian police—that will better enable the United Nations to establish international regimes and engage in in-country reconstruction. According to Evans, international regimes and domestic reconstruction are the twin paths to a stable international order.

Our Global Neighborhood, the product of the Commission on Global Governance, a distinguished panel of experts and policymakers, represents a self-conscious attempt to consider the future global order by synthesizing and extending many of the central arguments of prior commissions on the future of the world economy, security, and environment.[8] It should be noted that the background papers for the commission were written by liberal-minded scholars, including Ernst Haas and Peter Haas, and nowhere in the bibliography or citations is there a submission that is identifiable as realist.[9] The report is striking for its willingness to entertain numerous proposals designed to alter how states conduct their relations and organize their security.

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[6] Gareth Evans, "Cooperative Security and Instrastate Conflict," *Foreign Policy* 96 (Fall 1994). See also the related volume, Kevin Clements and Robin Ward, *Building International Community: Cooperating for Peace Case Studies* (St. Leonards and Canberra: Allen and Unwin and Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, 1994); and the interesting collection of responses to *Cooperating for Peace* in Stephanie Lawson, ed., *The New Agenda for Global Security: Cooperating for Peace and Beyond* (Canberra: Allen and Unwin, 1996).

[7] Stephanie Lawson, "Introduction: Activating the Agenda," in Lawson (fn. 6), 7–8.

[8] World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); South Commission, *The Challenge to the South* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

[9] *Issues in Global Governance: Papers Written for the Commission on Global Governance* (Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1995).

While many of the proposals are familiar and draw on the ideas found in *Agenda for Peace* and *Cooperating for Peace,* it goes beyond them in five respects. First, it focuses on the UN's role in economic, social, and environmental matters because an increasingly complex and integrated global polity requires similarly comprehensive international organizations. Second, it argues that traditional notions of security, defined by the state's defense of its territorial borders, do not exhaust the meaning of security in the current era; that is, since security has environmental, economic, and humanitarian components, the concept of security must be shifted away from its locus on the state and toward individuals. Third, *Our Global Neighborhood* is less constrained by or committed to the idea of state sovereignty than is Evans, who is unapologetically statist, or Boutros-Ghali, who as secretary-general of an interstate organization is also committed to sovereignty. Indeed, the vision of global governance in *Our Global Neighborhood* situates states alongside international and regional organizations, nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, and other transnational actors. Fourth, it is most explicit in its interest in issues of governance and seeing the UN as the most likely candidate to guide the ongoing global transformation. Fifth, the commission found it imperative to address the question of the values of global society and devotes an entire chapter to the subject.

Finally, the Report of the Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations, *The United Nations in Its Second Half-Century* (Independent Working Group), also examines the relationship between the future course of global politics and the potential functions of the UN. The project (funded by the Ford Foundation, supported by the Secretariat, and overseen by Paul Kennedy and Bruce Russett of Yale University) resembles *Our Global Neighborhood* in three important respects. First, it situated the UN within a global context that is marked by a growing and deepening interdependence. Second, it offers an integrated view of global politics and invests tremendous effort in developing proposals for the UN's security instruments and increasing its economic and social functions in ways that will enable it to manage the inensifying effects of interdependence. Third, it devotes considerable discussion to the need of the international community to "save failed states."[10] This agenda item is justified on principled, political, and strategic grounds: by saving failed states, the international community will better that community and foster a more stable international order.

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[10] See also Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner, "Saving Failed States," *Foreign Policy* 89 (Winter 1992–93); Steven Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996).

Each of the four reports offers a far-reaching vision of the current challenges to a stable international order, as well as numerous proposals for stabilizing that order. Even in better times, which these are not, most of these proposals would not likely see the light of day. Nonetheless, despite the inhospitable climate, some reforms continue. For instance, steps have been taken to establish effective stand-by arrangements for peacekeeping forces; there have been important developments for effecting the bureaucratic transition from peacekeeping and peace building; and in February 1997 the first informal consultations took place between the Security Council and several nongovernmental organizations on a matter of international peace and security (the Great Lakes region of Africa). These and other policy reforms receive considerable attention in these reports.[11] But an exclusive focus on how few of the proposals have been implemented risks prematurely dismissing a set of reports that provides a window into, and conceivably contributed to, the legitimation process in global politics.

A LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER?

The portrait painted by these reports is, not surprisingly, largely of a liberal international order; after all, many of those involved in the framing, drafting, and writing of these documents are self-described liberals—organic intellectuals (to use Gramsci's term) and epistemic communities (to use the term favored by constructivists).[12] These are intellectuals who believe in progress; the capacity of individuals to learn from the past; the construction of new political institutions to increase freedom and reduce the likelihood of physical violence; and thus the ability to improve the "moral character and material welfare of humankind."[13]

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[11] It is impossible to determine whether these proposals led directly to these and other reforms; after all, the proposals built on both already existing "lessons learned" in recent peacekeeping operations and the recommendations of other documents and commissions. At the least these commissions lent greater credibility to these and other proposals.

[12] Those scholars whose work is informed by a Gramscian approach also situate the UN system within a global, though largely economic, context and focus on its role as an agent of liberal change. See Craig Murphy, *International Organizations and Industrial Change* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); and Robert Cox, "The Crisis of World Order and the Problem of International Organizations," *International Journal* 35, no. 2 (1980).

[13] Mark Zacher and Richard Matthews, "Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands," in C. Kegley, ed., *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neo-Liberal Challenge* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 110.

But there are four other elements that define these documents as quintessentially liberal.[14]

First, these reports start from the premise that "international relations are being transformed by a process of modernization."[15] The opening pages of the reports detail how thickening economic, political, environmental, cultural, and communicative networks are revolutionizing the texture of global politics. The terms of reference for the Global Governance Commission (p. 366) stress those transformational qualities of global society that exhibit the "forces of integration and division" and thus present it with tremendous "uncertainty, challenge, and opportunity." The Independent Working Group (p. 4) similarly proclaims: "In the context of global forces unleashed in the past 50 years, only a collective effort can give states the framework and the strength to shape their own destiny in the promising but turbulent times that lie ahead. Our Report derives from this conviction." The communications revolution, continues the Independent Working Group (p. 7), is collapsing space and bringing us into greater contact, for good and for ill. Interdependence and modernization present new opportunities and challenges, and these reports are driven by a fear that interdependence, if unchecked, will have disastrous consequences for both national and international politics.

Second, these reports support the notion that international organizations in general and the UN in particular are needed to deal with the dizzying effects of modernization in these transitional times to help ameliorate conflicts that arise from interdependence.[16] There is historical precedent for this function of the UN: it helped to manage the earlier global transformation from the era of empires and colonialism to the era of sovereignty. As a critical forum for handling the rapid decolonization that followed World War II,[17] the UN justified its intervention on grounds of principle and security and it established numerous institutional mechanisms to encourage a relatively peaceful and speedy transition.[18] Boutros-Ghali observes that the present era, too, defined as it is by globalization and disintegration, demands international organizations like the United Nations.[19] In general, these commissions hold to the liberal tradition that looks to international organizations to help states cope with interdependence.

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[14] I derive these tenets from Robert Keohane, "International Liberalism Reconsidered," in John Dunn, ed., *The Economic Limits to Modern Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Andrew Moravcsik, "Liberalism and International Relations Theory," Center for International Affairs, Working Paper Series, no. 92-6 (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1993); Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "Structural Liberalism: The Nature and Sources of Western Political Order" (Manuscript, 1995); Zacher and Matthews (fn. 13); and Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," in Kegley (fn. 13).

[15] Zacher and Matthews (fn. 13), 110.

[16] See also James Rosenau, *The United Nations in a Turbulent World* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1992).

[17] See Robert Jackson, "The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization: Normative Change in International Relations," in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., *Ideas and Foreign Policy* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); Rupert Emerson, "Colonialism, Political Development, and the UN," *International Organization* 19 (Summer 1965); and Harold Jacobsen, "The United Nations and Colonialism: A Tentative Appraisal," *International Organization* 1 (Winter 1962).

Specifically, it is the United Nations in their view that is in a position to help the global polity through the difficult times ahead. With respect to security affairs, they endorse multilateralism and advance numerous institutional designs based on the lessons of institutionalism to foster a more stable and secure international order.[20] To this end, the UN can be a neutral forum in which states and nonstate actors can voice their grievances, communicate their preferences, and coordinate their policies. Further, it can establish confidence-building agreements and foster transparency so as to encourage states to adopt a more defensive and less militarized security posture.[21] And finally, it can create oversight and monitoring mechanisms to assure states that others will not defect from their agreements, most famously expressed by the UN's peacekeeping activities.[22] Most of these documents speak directly to the issue of enhancing the UN's ability to oversee and monitor (though not necessarily enforce) international and domestic agreements.

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[18] This raises a potentially interesting, though generally unexplored, question: what role did the UN play in helping to manage the end of the cold war? As international relations theorists isolate various explanations, they tend to focus on the Soviet Union's "new thinking" and the emerging belief that the U.S. would not take advantage of its international retreat and domestic reforms. Was the easy fall of the Soviet Union facilitated by the existence of the UN? The U.S. and the Soviet Union worked jointly and multilaterally to end various regional conflicts, and they did so under the auspices of the UN. It is conceivable that by working through the UN, the Soviets (1) could rest assured that there was a forum that guaranteed them superpower status and decision-making power despite their declining stature (and perhaps caused the U.S. to give it more due than otherwise might have been the case, for example, in the negotiations preceding the Persian Gulf War in January 1991); and (2) learned through doing that the U.S. would not try to settle these and other conflicts in a manner immediately disadvantageous to the Soviets. As Roberts and Kingsbury note, Soviet premier Gorbachev increasingly and simultaneously stressed the necessity of a framework of international cooperation and the importance of the UN. See Roberts and Kingsbury, "The UN's Roles in International Society," in A. Roberts and B. Kingsbury, eds., *United Nations, Divided World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 46–47.

[19] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Global Leadership after the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs* 75 (March–April 1996).

[20] See John Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); and Thomas Pickering, "Power and Purpose: Making Multilateralism Work," *Foreign Service Journal* (July 1992).

[21] Cameron Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War* (Washington, D.C.: USIP Press, 1994); *The United Nations and Nuclear Non-Proliferation*, United Nations Book Series, vol. 3 (New York: Department of Public Information, 1995).

[22] The peacekeeping literature has exploded over the past few years. For overviews and analysis, see Alan James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990); A. B. Featherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994); Paul Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); Paul Durch, ed., *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993); Michael Doyle et al., eds., *Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador* (New York: Cambridge Uni-

Third, these reports are quite unabashed in promoting the spread of democracy; the days are past when the UN dared not tread in the domestic realm because it feared violating state sovereignty. The world should be populated by democratic states, these reports uniformly claim, on principle and because of peace and security issues. Boutros-Ghali asserts that modern states possess certain constitutive foundations that revolve around democratic principles.[23] *Our Global Neighborhood* (p. 66) links democracy and legitimacy and asserts that the "democratic principle must be ascendant. The need for greater democracy arises out of the close linkage between legitimacy and effectiveness."[24]

The demand for democracy is also justified on peace and security grounds. Whereas the prevailing belief during the cold war had been that international order was premised on balances of power and some regulative norms that produced something akin to an "anarchical society,"[25] the reports under consideration here argue that domestic politics matters and that empirical sovereignty—the notion that states have some degree of legitimacy and control over their society and within their borders—enables states to uphold the norms of international society.[26] Simply stated, the rule of law at home is the foundation of the rule of law abroad.[27] Democracy, according to Boutros-Ghali, is the ultimate guarantor of peace. In the *Agenda for Peace* he writes:

> The authority of the United Nations system to act in this field [human rights] would rest on the consensus that social peace is as important as strategic or political peace. There is an obvious connection between democratic practices—such as the rule of law and transparency in decision making—and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable political order.

Gareth Evans (p. 53) enthusiastically seconds the sentiment. Indeed, all four reports take this assumed connection between domestic and international order to justify greater intervention in domestic affairs.

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versity Press, 1997); John MacKinley and Jarat Chopra, "Second Generation Multinational Operations," *Washington Quarterly* (Summer 1992); and Thomas Weiss, ed., *The United Nations and Civil Wars* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995). For the factual side, see *United Nations Peacekeeping Information Notes* (New York: United Nations Press, 1995); and *Blue Helmets*, 3d ed. (New York: United Nations Press, 1996).

[23] See also Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace: One Year Later," *Orbis* 37 (Summer 1993), 329; idem, "Democracy: A Newly Recognized Imperative," *Global Governance* 1 (Winter 1995), 3–12; and the recently published *Agenda for Democratization* (New York: UN Publications, 1996).

[24] See also Boutros-Ghali (fn. 23, 1995).

[25] Hedley Bull, *Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: MacMillan, 1983).

[26] Robert Jackson, *Quasi-States* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

[27] These reports draw on the growing literature on the "democratic peace." See Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80 (1986); and Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

Not only will an international system populated by democratic states decrease the likelihood of interstate war, but democratic states also will reduce the likelihood that domestic tensions will become militarized and internationalized. While the reports acknowledge traditional interstate sources of violence and conflict, they nearly assume that the root causes of most conflicts reside in the domestic sphere. Thus, *Our Global Neighborhood* predicts that even though interstate war is not extinct, "in the years ahead the world is likely to be troubled primarily by eruptions of violence within countries" (p. 81), and the Independent Working Group focuses on intrastate conflict. These reports hold that the patterns of war are shifting and that the best way to minimize domestic violence (and thus the prospect of international violence) is to widen the community of democratic states.

All four reports, particularly *Our Global Neighborhood* and *The United Nations in Its Second Half-Century*, emphasize the importance of human rights as an issue of domestic and international governance. Since the mid-1980s the UN has become quite active in the area of human rights, a change from the cold war period and the era of decolonization, when the United Nations was prohibited by member states from investigating and considering issues of human rights.[28] Today, most peacekeeping operations have a human rights component, and the UN held a World Congress in Vienna in 1993 and established the position of high commissioner for human rights the following year.[29]

Human rights has emerged on the international agenda for several reasons, but one catalyst is the belief that "civilized" states should respect human rights and have some degree of domestic accountability based on democratic principles of rule, because they represent both a means to an end, for example, international order, and an end in itself. The international community increasingly treats respect for human and ethnic rights as a matter of principle and an issue of peace and security.[30] Because of the presumed relationship between domestic and international order, then, these reports look to the UN to articulate the constitutive features of the modern state.

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[28] Jacobsen (fn. 17), 47; and Louis Henkin, "The United Nations and Human Rights," *International Organization* 19 (Summer 1965), 512.

[29] See, for instance, Philip Alston, ed., *The United Nations and Human Rights* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); David Forsythe, "The United Nations and Human Rights at Fifty: An Incremental but Incomplete Revolution," *Global Governance* 1 (September–December 1995); and W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, "The United Nations and the Protection of Individual and Group Rights," *International Social Science Journal* 144, no. 3 (1995).

[30] This is not the first time that an international organization has argued that domestic politics matters for international order and is a legitimate concern of the international community. The League of Nations, too, through its mandate policies and various commissions on minority rights and plebiscites

The fourth, liberal, dimension of these reports is the shift away from the sovereign state as the principal actor in global politics and toward, first, identity-based groups such as nations, indigenous peoples, women, and ethnicities, and, second, the individual as a central actor. There has always been tension between the UN's role as representative of sovereign states and its role as representative of peoples and individuals who have universal rights and deserve the protection of the international community. For most of its history the UN has resolved that tension in favor of state sovereignty, but these reports advocate a change in the direction of greater balance. The Global Governance Commission has a chapter on the values of the global community, which states are exhorted to respect; while these values are forwarded as principled rather than liberal, few liberals would object to them. The Independent Working Group advocates the protection of the "social fabric" of societies in which the "rights of every individual are guaranteed by the rule of law, people can participate in their own governance, and disagreements over policy issues are settled peaceably" (p. 34). These reports, moreover, propose a set of institutions—including the rule of law, democracy, and markets—to promote political and economic opportunity and freedom. These reports, then, are attempting to protect individual rights by instilling liberal values within already constituted sovereign states.

Furthermore, as the documents narrate, modernization processes and interdependence are creating new networks of association that include domestic challenges to the state, a proliferation of transnational movements and organizations, and a nascent global civil society. The Global Governance Commission reviews at length the changing ways that individuals identify and locate themselves vis-à-vis other communities. Increased interdependence has created a "common neighborhood," whose members have mutual interests and also share an increasingly common culture. Thus, even if the state remains the primary actor in global politics, the results of interdependence, both positive and negative, are to create new networks and associations, many of which are attempting to guide the state's activities in the domestic and international sphere.

Although NGOs and transnational organizations are playing an increasingly important role in various international issues, they tend to be included in international organizations such as the UN only on an ad

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in Europe, made the case that there was an important relationship between domestic and international order. See Dorothy Jones, *Code of Peace* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). As reflected by the League of Nations mandate system, at issue was whether or not the recognized state could maintain some semblance of order—that domestic order and the capacity to govern should be used as criteria for independence and recognition.

hoc basis because such international organizations usually restrict participation to states. Consequently, the Independent Working Group and the Global Governance Commission propose to establish various mechanisms at the UN and its sister organizations to include these nonstate actors more fully in all aspects of the decision-making process. They envision new councils that directly link peoples and the organs of the international community in ways that challenge the state's monopoly on decision-making authority at the global level. The hope is to give domestic groups normative leverage over states that violate the norms of the international community on issues of domestic governance.

To summarize: we can consider these documents to be liberal to the extent that their narratives are informed by a belief in progress: that modernization and interdependence are transforming the character of global politics; that institutions can be established to help manage these changes; that democracy is a principled issue and can enhance peace and security; and that the UN has an obligation to protect individuals, promote universal values, and create institutions that can encourage political and economic freedom. These assertions are more than simply a set of proposals for peace and security, they are also a blueprint for a durable, stable, and legitimate international order. Thus, a recurring theme of these reports is what constitutes legitimate state action and how the UN can gather both the resources and the authority to fulfill this new mandate. Such matters speak directly to the larger issue of legitimacy in global politics.

LEGITIMACY

In offering positions on what should be the rules of the game and what is considered acceptable behavior, these reports address the concept of legitimacy, both substantive and procedural. First, ends that are considered desirable and the means selected to pursue these ends should be viewed as proper by the relevant political community; and second, the decision-making process should correspond to practice that is deemed proper by the members of the community.[31] Substantive legitimacy dominates the discussion in the reports, although they also consider the importance of institutional reforms for furthering procedural legitimacy, for instance, the need to reform the Security Council and democratize other organs of the United Nations system.

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[31] For substantive legitimacy, see Peter Berger, Brigitte Berger, and Hansfried Kellner, *The Homeless Mind* (New York: Vintage Books, 1973); W. Richard Scott, "Unpacking Institutional Arguments," in Walter Powell and Paul Dimaggio, *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 169–71; and Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1964), 124. For procedural legitimacy as applied to the UN, see Franck (fn. 5), 24, 25; idem, *Fairness in International Law and Institutions* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); and Bruce Russett, ed., *The Once and Future Security Council* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).

Because political orders are social constructs and a product of material and normative forces, the reports focus on how these orders are produced and the struggles that are waged to establish their legitimation principles. "Politics is not merely a struggle for power," observed Inis Claude, "but also a contest over legitimacy, a competition in which the conferment or denial, the confirmation or revocation, of legitimacy is an important stake."[32] Kissinger began his classic *A World Restored* by stating that the central issue for the post-Napoleonic order was the construction of a set of socially recognized and collectively legitimated principles that determines what is permissible and what is prohibited.[33] In many respects, these reports apply Kissinger's historical concerns to the post–cold war era.

How then are international political orders legitimated? As Claude noted in his classic article, a notable phenomenon of the twentieth century is that the agents of legitimization tend to be international political organizations, and since World War II that function has been nearly monopolized by the UN.[34] These reports reinforce Claude's observation, as the debate over the goals of the international community and the acceptable means to achieve those goals arguably centered in and around the UN, because only there would any emerging arrangements obtain some moral standing and legitimacy. After all, any international political order—or any political order for that matter—needs to be legitimated if it is to have any staying power or be based on anything other than coercion. And the UN provides a forum for collective legitimation, a place where the international order is coronated.

It is impressive how many proposals and discussions about the future international order occurred through the vehicle of the United Nations. Why would major and minor powers alike turn to the United Nations? Various explanations point to material considerations, of course, but it is worth considering the UN's symbolic role in the international community. One of the first acts of an independent state, for example, is to apply for admission to the United Nations, for, as former Secretary-General Perez de Cueller observed, joining the UN is the "final confirmation of independence, nationhood, and sovereignty."[35] These reports articulate both implicitly and sometimes explicitly the necessity of locating a "center" not only to provide the international community with a concrete steering mechanism but also to give it a symbolic footing and some meaning. As Gareth Evans observes, "The world needs a center, and some confidence that the center is holding: the United Nations is the only credible candidate."[36] And as *Our Global Neighborhood* affirms, it is the only international forum that has the legitimacy and stature to operate in these matters. During this period of rapid change and fluidity it can best provide the stabilizing influence needed by the international system.[37]

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[32] Claude, "Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations," *International Organization* 20 (Summer 1966), 368.

[33] Kissinger (fn. 5).

[34] Claude (fn. 32).

[35] Javier Perez de Cuellar, "The United Nations and the United States" (Address at the fiftieth anniversary celebration, Dartmouth College, May 10, 1988). Cited from Franck (fn. 5), 9.

Following Emile Durkheim, one can ask whether the UN represents the collective beliefs of states in a way that is almost quasi religious in character. "There can be no society," Durkheim wrote, "which does not feel the need of upholding and reaffirming at regular intervals, the collective sentiments and collective ideas which make its unity and its personality."[38] The turn to the UN after the cold war becomes more plausible in light of its symbolic role vis-à-vis the international community. Indeed, the turn to the UN may even be necessitated by "dynamic density," that is, intensifying patterns of interaction that are generating new forms of social organizations and collective representations.[39] In general, even if the principles of the international community embodied in the UN Charter and in its thousands of documents and resolutions do not have the standing of social facts, the UN is still the cathedral of the international community, the organizational repository of the community's collective beliefs.[40]

What is the source of the UN's legitimacy? The UN is the only organization that approximates universality and is invested by states as having some degree of moral authority. Most simply, it has this legitimacy and authority by virtue of the fact that member states invest legitimacy in it.[41] To be sure, the UN's legitimacy has varied over time and across constituencies, but no other regional or international organization ever emerged to rival it, even when it was at its lowest ebb.[42] Indeed, whereas neoliberal institutionalism might view the UN's universality as a potential liability for overcoming collective action problems, these reports hold that it is its very universality that generates its legitimacy and thus its ability to encourage states to comply with international norms.

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[36] Canadian House of Commons, External Affairs Committee; quoted from Lawson (fn. 7), 3.

[37] Oran Young, "The United Nations and the International System," *International Organization* 22 (Autumn 1968), 906.

[38] Cited from W. Richard Scott, *Institutions and Organizations* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Press, 1995), 10.

[39] Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society* (New York: Free Press, 1964); John Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity," in Robert Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).

[40] The importance and potential behavioral impact of the UN's symbolic role is also raised by Roberts and Kingsbury (fn. 18), 19–22.

[41] Claude (fn. 32); Thomas Franck, *Nation against Nation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).

The reports expect the UN to legitimate the broad principles of state action, not a new role for it. The UN embodies many of the most important constitutive norms of the international community, norms that, in effect, prescribe how modern, sovereign states are expected to behave. Dorothy Jones observes that there are "nine fundamental principles that constitute a summary of state reflection upon proper action in the international sphere. . . . All nine can be found in the United Nations Charter but the authors of the document did not create them."[43] These principles can be thought of as constitutive norms, for they tell states how to enact their identity as members of the international community; and these norms emerge from both a climate of fear, that is, a concern for what might happen if these basic norms were not heeded, and a hope for how the international community ought to operate.[44] And while the architects of the UN did not invent these norms, the UN gave them an institutional home and legitimacy. The reports reiterate these principles and stress the importance of renouncing war (except in self-defense) and unilateral intervention and of embracing a multilateral sensibility.

States of course do violate these norms of state action, but such violations do not tell us whether the norms shape state behavior on other occasions; that is, do states ever alter their actions in order to be viewed as legitimate by other states? These reports are betting on it. While recognizing that at times there may be no substitute for the heavy hand of state power—and to this end they discuss sanctions and multilateral military operations—these documents posit that states also care about their legitimacy because they are part of an international community from which they derive their rights, obligations, and authority to act in legitimately sanctioned ways.[45] Power, these documents are suggesting, is conferred on those who adhere to the community's values and norms, and leadership is not only about having military power but also about projecting moral purpose.[46] Inis Claude contends that collective legitimization function of the UN shapes states' behavior because, simply put, state officials have made it important by their actions and statements. The very demand for this function is its source of power and thus its causal force.[47]

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[42] Ernst Haas argues that a rough measure of the legitimacy of the United Nations is the degree to which "member states invoke its purposes and principles . . . to justify national policy." See Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1964), 133. For a good discussion of how to verify empirically whether a political order has some measure of legitimacy, see Arthur Stinchcombe, *Constructing Social Theories* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 162–64.

[43] These principles of state action are "sovereign equality of states; territorial integrity and political independence of states; equal rights and self-determination of peoples; nonintervention in internal affairs of states; peaceful settlement of disputes between states; no threat or use of force; fulfillment in good faith of international obligations; cooperation with other states; and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms." See Jones "The Declaratory Tradition in Modern International Law," in T. Nardin and D. Marpel, eds., *Traditions of International Ethics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 44–45.

[44] Jones (fn. 43), 48–49. On constitutive norms and state action, see Ron Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter Katzenstein, "Identity, Norms, and Security," in Peter Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

These reports offer various proposals designed to use the UN status and moral authority to guide state action. Several of the proposals in *Our Global Neighborhood* can operate only if states care about their reputation. One proposal to stop "grave threats to the security of people" is to develop a Council of Petitions to include a panel of distinguished, independent individuals whose task would be dedicated to safeguarding the security of peoples by making recommendations to the secretary-general and the Security Council. "It would be a Council without any power of enforcement. But the eminence of its members and the quality of its proceedings can foster a measure of respect that will give its conclusions considerable moral authority" (p. 262). The commission also asserts that the easiest and most efficient method for ensuring compliance is through direct contact, publicity, deterrence, and the "mobilization of shame" (p. 328).[48] This highlights one of the UN's most important functions (and one on which it holds a monopoly): to distribute seals of approval and disapproval. "The UN's functions in proclaiming principles and conferring legitimacy," write Roberts and Kingsbury, "remain central to the effective maintenance of international society."[49]

But does the search for legitimacy shape the behavior of the most powerful?

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[45] "Nations, or those who govern them," writes Thomas Franck, "recognize that the obligation to comply is owed by them to the community of states as the reciprocal of that community's validation of their nation's statehood." See Franck (fn. 5), 196.

[46] See also Paul Schroeder, "New World Order: A Historical Perspective," *Washington Quarterly* 17, no. 2 (1994), 33; John Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," in Stephen Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983).

[47] Claude (fn. 32), 374–75.

[48] See also Abraham Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, "On Compliance," *International Organization* (Spring 1993).

[49] Roberts and Kingsbury (fn. 18), 57.

> If legitimate power is . . . power that is valid according to rules, and where the rules themselves are justifiable by and in conformity with the underlying beliefs, then the main way in which the powerful will maintain their legitimacy is by respecting the intrinsic limits set to their power by the rules and the underlying principles on which they are grounded. Legitimate power, that is to say, is limited power.[50]

Power and legitimacy, in short, are not conflicting concepts but rather are complementary ones.[51] The powerful, too, want their actions to be viewed as legitimate, if only to maintain their power and further their interests. Even the powerful, in this view, cannot act in an expedient and narrowly self-interested manner and must observe international society's underlying rules and norms.

Thus it is a striking feature of the post–cold war period that even the most powerful states seek the UN's stamp of approval. While there are materially based reasons for this development, these reports highlight cosmopolitanism.[52] The Global Governance Commission, for instance, suggests that increasing interdependence and a growing global civic identity is one factor in how state officials think about themselves, conceptualize their interests, organize their activities, and desire to have their actions collectively legitimated. The UN's stamp of approval, however, does not come without cost: the operation must be viewed as consistent with the goals of the member states, its very design is subject to amendment during the authorization process. The result is that the member state seeking authorization forfeits considerable autonomy. The reports uniformly celebrate this development.

Such a development may be particularly important in the area of humanitarian intervention. While these documents express tremendous support for the concept of humanitarian intervention, there is the chronic danger that states will claim that their interventions are, by definition, humanitarian, when, in fact, they are designed to further their own interests. For this reason, the reports insist that the authority to legitimate a humanitarian operation must reside with the UN; it need not be the executing agent, but at the very least it should be the authorizing forum that legitimates such actions and ensures that they really are consistent with the goals of the international community and implemented using the means accepted by that community.[53]

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[50] David Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1991), 35.

[51] Claude (fn. 32), 368.

[52] For a discussion of these points, see Michael Barnett, "Spheres of Influence?" in Joseph Lepgold and Thomas Weiss, eds., *Collective Conflict Management and Changing World Politics* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997).

[53] Gene Lyons and Michael Mastanduno tie legitimacy to the multilateral character of humanitarian operations. See Lyons and Mastanduno, "Introduction," in Lyons and Mastanduno, *Beyond*

In general, these documents are an important contribution to the debate over the post–cold war international order. For them, the UN fulfills a legitimation function in global politics: not only does it potentially legitimate the principles upon which the future international order rests, but the legitimation of those principles carries with it the expectation that states will honor its norms. States will violate these norms to be sure, but the reports are suggesting that states do have available to them various mechanisms for stabilizing their social relations, including their ability to confer or deny approval and legitimacy.

THE UN AS AN AGENT OF NORMATIVE INTEGRATION?

As advocates of a liberal international order, these reports will be read differently by their various audiences, depending on how receptive they are to the prospect of such an order and on how they view the role they are supposed to play in bringing it about. The West is the first audience. Sometimes it is subtly chastised for being hypocritical and not abiding by the rules that it established; this is one reading of the emphasis on strengthening the role of international law and the International Court of Justice in adjudicating disputes. More often, however, the most powerful Western states are criticized for not providing the (liberal) leadership role for which they are well suited materially and ideologically. The U.S. is the primary, though unnamed, culprit. While it celebrates liberalism and speaks of enlarging the community of democratic states, it has been wont to support politically and financially the very institution that might operate effectively to this end. The international community needs leadership to accomplish collective action, and the likely leaders are liberal, Western states. These reports, then, are in part attempts to convince Western states of where their interests reside.

The Third World sits in a different place. Arguably, much of the Third World is viewed by these commissions not as a source of support for a liberal international order but rather as a potential site of resistance. Nearly all the reports are concerned with securing the compliance of those most resistant to and most distant from the liberal international order; these are actors located almost exclusively in non-Western societies. This highlights an important feature of the UN:

Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 12; and Martha Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," in Peter Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

though ostensibly a global organization, it is in fact dedicated to addressing Third World and North-South issues. As Anthony Parsons observes, the UN, far from maintaining a global jurisdiction, is generally "preoccupied with the problems of the newly independent majority, namely the dangerous disputes in the so-called Third World."[54] This focus is as true today as it was during the UN's first forty years. Boutros-Ghali's proclamation that the UN's mandate in this era of globalization-cum-disintegration is to develop markets and impart the rule of law and democracy leaves little uncertainty about the problem and its proposed solution.[55]

This raises a central issue: how do the weak come to give their consent to a political order, especially since the legitimation principles that undergird an international order usually represent the interests of the powerful and operate to their relative advantage.[56] Whether the weak accept an order from which they might not fully benefit depends on whether and how its norms and values come to be universalized and internalized, such that the values of the individual are projected to be the values of humanity.[57] The extent to which this occurs affects the degree to which coercion and selective incentives will be necessary to reproduce a particular order and enhance the prospects for social integration.[58]

These reports identify a number of theories that purport to explain how and why the weak consent to a particular order. The weak are more likely to accept the principles forwarded by the strong, in the first instance, if such principles are convincingly framed as universal rather than particularistic. The very legitimation of these principles by the UN is an important step in this direction. By contrast, resistance is likely if these values are seen as Western in orientation or as fostering the West's continued power in global politics.

Second, the UN conceivably represents a source of state identity and interests by providing the organizational space for interstate interaction. *Our Global Neighborhood* also observes that the UN's deliberative functions—generally disparaged for being all talk all the time—represent a source of new interests, practices, and conceivably identities. Chadwick Alger once observed that interaction among member states at the UN led to a socialization process, fostering new identities and interests.[59] Other scholars too have noted that international organizations represent a site of new identities, interests, and categories of action.[60]

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[54] Parsons, "The UN and National Interests of States," in Roberts and Kingsbury (fn. 18), 111–12.

[55] Boutros-Ghali (fn. 19).

[56] Robert Cox, John Ruggie, and Tom Biersteker have examined various features of how a liberal political order was established and to whose advantage it operates. See Cox, *Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Ruggie (fn. 46); and Biersteker, "The Triumph of Neoclassical Economics in the Developing World," in J. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Cziempel, eds., *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). See also Beetham (fn. 50), chap. 4.

[57] Terry Eagleton, *Ideology* (New York: Verso Press, 1991), 56.

[58] Jürgen Habermas, "Legitimation Problems in the Modern State," in *Communication and the Evolution of Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979).

These reports also propose the establishment of various mechanisms and institutions that might help convey norms from the North to the South.[61] If it is successful at this, the United Nations can help to create new categories of actors, new interests for actors to pursue, and new strategies that reflect new identities and interests. The Independent Working Group proposes to establish a social council that is "empowered to supervise and integrate the work of all UN activities relating to issues of social development" and grants nonstate actors access to its deliberations. The other reports, though not proposing new councils, are equally insistent on the need to establish mechanisms by which the UN can regulate those societies that are in "distress."

Indeed, the UN's post–cold war activities can be seen as an attempt to expand the number of actors who are committed to and can be counted as part of a liberal political order. Consider the UN's second-generation peacekeeping operations:[62] they have largely concerned facilitating the transition from civil war to civil society, from "failed state" to a state able to govern itself, by investing it with popular legitimacy and democratic forms of rule that nominally include new constitutions, human rights provisions, elections, and so on.[63] Several of these peacekeeping operations established and trained new civilian police forces modeled along Western lines and designed to foster democratic identities and practices. Most of these reports also advocate channeling more resources into postconflict peace-building measures aimed at resolving conflicts before they escalate.

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[59] Alger, "United Nations Participation as a Learning Process," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 27, no. 3 (1963), 425. See also Claude (fn. 32), 373; Connie McNeely, *Constructing the Nation-State: International Organization and Prescriptive Action* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1995); and Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).

[60] John Boli and George M. Thomas, "World Culture in the World Polity: A Century of International Non-Governmental Organization," *American Sociological Review* 62 (April 1997); and McNeely (fn. 59).

[61] For broader theoretical statements on the relationship between organizations and the transmission of norms and acceptable practices, see Dimaggio and Powell (fn. 31); W. Richard Scott and Soren Christensen, eds., *The Institutional Construction of Organizations: International and Longitudinal Studies* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1995); John Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond," *International Organization* 47 (Winter 1993); and Martha Finnemore, "International Organizations as Teachers of Norms," *International Organization* 47 (Autumn 1993).

[62] For an expanded discussion of this argument, see Michael Barnett, "The New U.N. Politics of Peace: From Juridical Sovereignty to Empirical Sovereignty," *Global Governance* 1 (Winter 1995).

[63] Amnesty International, *Peacekeeping and Human Rights* (Mimeo, January 1994); Sally Morphet, "UN Peacekeeping and Election-Monitoring," in Roberts and Kingsbury (fn. 18); Helman and Ratner (fn. 10); and David Padilla and Elizabeth Houppert, "International Election Observing: Enhancing the Principle of Free and Fair Elections," *Emory International Law Review* 7 (1993).

To summarize, these reports suggest that all international political orders need some measure of legitimacy if they are to be sustained without the threat or deployment of force. At the heart of the matter is the degree to which the weak and those who might not ever or evenly benefit from that order accede to its principles. The more states disagree on fundamental rules, particularly states that view themselves as victims of this system, the more precarious the international order.[64] These reports identify the UN as a central agent for advancing this process of narrowing the number of states that object to a liberal international order and thus for achieving normative integration. In this respect, these reports were written by "sociological liberals," individuals who do not believe that liberalism is an analytic category that stands prior to society but rather believe that liberal individuals and societies emerge from social and historical processes.[65] Conceivably, the UN can contribute to international order by shaping state action through its legitimation function and the articulation and transmission of the norms of state action in domestic and international spheres. At least so these commissions predict.

CONCLUSION

The reports under consideration represent a debate over the post–cold war international order, the struggle to legitimate a liberal international order, and an attempt to extend the circle of believers. Despite the UN's current financial straits and the political paralysis that weakens its ability to act as an agent of legitimation and norm transmission, the UN nevertheless has symbolic standing and a legitimation function. This function may prove to be particularly important when the rules of the game are in flux, that is, when there is a transition from one order to another or when there are significant challenges to the established order. No other international organization or body has the capacity to legitimate the underlying principles and norms of the international order, so it is to the UN that states turn for legitimation and sanction. These commissions remind international relations scholars that international order is founded not only on a stable balance of power but also on a set of legitimation principles. Certainly, few political orders are ever sustained by shared norms alone, but fewer still have existed for any length of time without them. What classical realist scholars understood has been forgotten by contemporary students of global politics.

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[64] R. J. Vincent, "Order in International Politics," in J. D. B. Miller and R. J. Vincent, eds., *Order and Violence: Hedley Bull and International Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 54.

[65] Keohane (fn. 14).

If these reports can be taken as indicative of the debate over the substance of the international order, the champions of liberalism seem to be having their day and those who feel otherwise are on the defensive. Liberal principles are accepted in the West; at issue is whether they will be accepted and internalized by non-Western states. These commissions are acting as the missionaries for the post–cold war order, preaching to the converted that the UN can be an important agent of a liberal order and hoping to widen the community of believers. Couched in this way, the discussion directs our attention toward sites of confrontation and contestation and toward the potential mechanisms that encourage the diffusion of this liberal sensibility at the global level. The UN, according to these reports, can play a critical role in both regards. Indeed, the general liberal tenor of the post–cold war order is made even more apparent if the focus is widened from the UN Secretariat to include the other organs of the United Nations system. The World Bank, the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, the United Nations Development Program, and other organizations generally subscribe to liberal tenets. Taken as a whole, the United Nations system might be read as inextricably involved with the impressive institutional isomorphism of international politics over the last half century.[66]

Yet these reports are silent on the potential contradictions inherent in any international order in general and in liberalism in particular. Thus, they fail to acknowledge that the pursuit of some of the goals of these reports might undermine others. The reports gloss over, for instance, the disputed relationship between economic growth and democracy. They similarly fail to consider how market mechanisms, which are accepted as the proper way to organize an economy, can exacerbate tensions between identity-based groups and perhaps contribute to the disintegration of local communities in already fragile polities. Such tensions are particularly manifest in many postconflict peace-building situations where World Bank officials call for fiscal responsibility and structural adjustment-type policies while other parts of the UN system clamor for ethnic peace based on minimizing the costs of postconflict reconstruction. Nor do these reports consider the possible connection between liberalism and inequality.[67] Finally, they tout the construction of international organizations as the panacea for the world's problems without duly noting that while these organizations may be above power politics, they are still fraught with politics. International organizations themselves can become new sites of authority that are unaccountable to either member states or the populations they are mandated to assist, and thus might pursue policies that are at odds with the interests of either of these constituencies.[68]

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[66] On institutional isomorphism, see George Thomas et al., *Institutional Structure: Constituting the State, Society, and the Individual* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Press, 1987).

But this relationship between the UN and these different strands of liberalism directs our attention to the general neglect of the UN by scholars of international relations. Whether international relations theorists consider a role for the UN in the production of international order depends on how they conceptualize international order and security. Neorealism envisions no such role for the UN because the organization does not possess coercive mechanisms or a robust collective security system. Neoliberal institutionalism generally leans toward a neorealist view in that it does not see conditions as being ripe for an effective or vibrant role for the UN. By adhering to a strict rationalism and leaning heavily on materialism, both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism are hard-pressed to identify much of a role for the UN in the production and maintenance of international order in the ways advocated by these reports.

In contrast to neorealism, which emphasizes coercion and force, and neoliberal institutionalism, which focuses on stabilized exchange relations through norms and institutions, constructivism entertains the possibility that order is also achieved through a normative structure, an acceptance of some basic rules of the game that place normative restrictions on behavior.[69] Not all constructivists are advocates of a liberal worldview or agree that a liberal world would be a pacific world; nor would constructivists argue that coercion and stabilized exchange relations are not important factors in the reproduction of international order. But because constructivism shares with these reports a consideration of how international order is secured through normative forces, it is better able to consider, first, how international order might be produced by the articulation, legitimation, and transmission of the codes of state conduct, and second, the potential role of the UN in all the above. Few international orders are ever founded or sustained by force alone, something well understood by the policymakers who drafted these reports and wisely heeded by international relations theorists who attempt to understand their actions and the international orders that they construct and sustain.

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[67] Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire Woods, "Globalisation and Inequality," *Millennium* 24, no. 3 (1995); Marie-Cloude Smouts, "International Organizations and Inequality among States," *International Social Science Journal* 144, no. 3 (1995); Sandra Whitworth, *Feminism and International Relations: Towards a Political Economy of Gender in Interstate and Non-Governmental Institutions* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).

[68] See, for instance, Liisa Mallki, "Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, Humanitarianism, and Dehistoricization," *Cultural Anthropology* 11 (Fall 1996); Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations" (Paper presented at the International Studies Association annual meetings, Toronto, March 20–24, 1997).

[69] Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," *International Security* 20 (Summer 1995); Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein (fn. 44); and Emanuel Adler "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism and World Politics," *European Journal of International Relations* (forthcoming). See also Dennis Wrong, *The Problem of Order* (New York: Free Press, 1994), chap. 3; Jeffrey Alexander, *Twenty Lectures* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), chap. 1; and John Rhoads, *Critical Issues in Social Theory* (College Station: Penn State Press, 1991), chap. 5.