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United Kingdom and Northern Ireland
von Tony Bunyan (Großbritannien) und Mike Tomlinson (Nordirland)
This article signs introductory a detailed
picture of the british intelligence services:
C.1 MI5, the Security Service
A.1 MI6, the Secret Service or Secret
Intelligence Service
D.1 Defence Intelligence Staff
B.1 Government Communication Headquarters
- GCHQ
The following parts deal with the central
structure of intelligence, telephone tapping and new UK secrecy definitions.
The role of the intelligence agencies
in the North of Ireland first is described by basic information on the Security
Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), the RUC Special Branch
and Military Intelligence and then the co-ordination between them is discussed.
C.1 MI5, the Security Service
MI5, the Security Service, was founded
in 1909. It deals with counter-espionage and subversion within the UK and
the colonies. The ending of the Cold War posed more of a threat to MI5 than
to MI6. MI6 claim that there are many potential threats to the interests of
the UK, in the EC, Eastern Europe and the Third World. The gathering of political
and economic intelligence, countering rival espionage agencies, as well as
keeping an eye on the nascent democracies in Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) ensures its role well into the future. The exchange
of intelligence with the KGB and other East European agencies on Third World
countries previously close to the Soviet Union is one of its current priorities.
With decolonisation in the postwar
period MI5 saw its role contract but this coincided with the increased Soviet
’threat’ which gave it a new role. Counter-espionage against the Soviet Union
in the UK and counter-subversion against supposed Communist sympathisers were
it main tasks. In the seventies it also developed a counter-terrorist branch.
With the ending of Soviet espionage and subversion, real or imagined, and
with their own assessment that internal subversion was at a low point, MI5
searched for a new role.
Terrorism is the issue which has allowed
MI5 to take a major part in the working groups of Trevi (the inter-governmental
grouping outside of EC structures). MI5 has been active in the Trevi network
since it was set up in 1976. It also participates in the ‘Police Working Group
on Terrorism' - meetings of EC security services, Special Branches and police.
Indeed, it has argued that the EC is becoming part of the ‘domestic' rather
than a ‘foreign' sphere.
The Special Branch (which is part of
the police force) was founded in 1883 to combat Irish Fenian bombings. It
maintained this role in Britain while also helping MI5 with espionage and
counter-subversion. However, a power struggle resulted in 1992 in MI5 being
given the lead role in combatting Irish terrorism. A similar struggle is taking
place over their respective roles in the EU. The Special Branch in the Metropolitan
Police through its European Liaison Section (ELS) established links with its
counterparts from 1976 and has a dedicated communications system. But it was
MI5 who trailed and pinpointed three IRA people in Gibraltar who were shot
dead in 1988.
The Security Service Act 1989
This Act was the first to recognise
the existence of MI5, the internal security agency since its formation. The
role of MI5 is defined in the Act as:
"the protection of national security
and, in particular, its protection against threats from espionage, terrorism
and sabotage, from the activities of agents of foreign powers and from actions
intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by political, industrial
or violent means... (and) to safeguard the economic well-being of the United
Kingdom against threats posed by actions or intentions of persons outside
the British Islands".
It thus officially recognised the working
definition of ’subversion' used by MI5 and the Special Branch since 1970
to justify the surveillance of political and trade union activists. The Act
allows MI5 to apply to the Home Secretary for a warrant to enter and/or interfere
with property, that is, to secretly enter a home or office; to steal or plant
material; and to install listening devices. It created the post of Security
Service Commissioner whose job is
i) to review the issuing of warrants;
ii) to forward cases where the Tribunal
finds evidence of unlawful actions by MI5 to the Home Secretary with a recommendation
for compensation to be paid. The Tribunal is comprised of between three and
five lawyers appointed by the Queen. When it investigates complaints - about
‘interference with property' or the passing of derogatory information to an
employer (e.g. the Civil Service or defence contractor) - the Tribunal has
to decide if MI5 acted properly. In deciding whether MI5 acted within its
powers MI5 is able to argue that it had ‘reasonable grounds for believing'
that the person was or is a member of a:
category of persons regarded by the
Service as requiring investigation in the discharge of its functions...
The Tribunal is not allowed to give
any information to a complainant except where it makes report to the Home
Secretary to recommend compensation because it decides MI5 has acted outside
of its remit. With this exception it is not allowed when turning down a complaint
to say whether or not a person was or was not subject to surveillance. Moreover,
the decisions of the Commissioner and the Tribunal ‘shall not be subject to
appeal or liable to be questioned in any court' (para 5.4).
Annual reports on MI5: 1990-1993
The first annual report of the Security
Service Commissioner, the Rt Hon Lord Justice Stuart-Smith, contained no figures
on the number of search warrants issued to MI5 (the Security Service) by the
Home Secretary. Nor were any of the 55 complaints made by members of the public
upheld by the new Tribunal. Judge Stuart- Smith said it would not be ‘in the
public interest' to give the figures.
The report stated that applications
for warrants can be made to the Northern Ireland Secretary as well as the
Home Secretary, and indeed to any Secretary of State in emergency if the Home
Secretary is unavailable. The report makes clear that search warrants are
issued not just against individuals but also for organisations (para 4), and
that MI5 fronts applications from other agencies (para 3). Applications are
made to the Warrants Unit in the Home Office, are valid for up to six months
and are renewable. The report also indicates that warrants are issued for
fishing expeditions as the information sought by MI5 ‘may be vital in determining
whether such a threat is real or not' (para 12).
In the second report, for 1991 (issued in 1992), Lord Justice Stuart-Smith,
said MI5 no longer destroyed any of its records, even those it opened erroneously,
in case the Security Service Tribunal (which investigates complaints by members
of the public) wants to see them. The policy, he reported: ‘is to retain records
indefinitely in case they are of relevance any time in the future...and they
[MI5] cannot accurately predict when files will ever be needed again. In my
opinion as a general policy this is acceptable'.
MI5's procedure is first to open a
‘temporary' file, with a maximum life of three years where they are uncertain
if a permanent one is required. Then a ‘permanent' file is opened using a
system of colour coding which controls how files are used. Once the ‘permanent'
file is opened there is a period coded ‘green' when the person is put under
surveillance. At the end of the ‘green' period it changes to ’amber' when
further inquiries are prohibited but new information can be added. After the
designated ‘amber' period a file is coded ‘red' when inquiries are prohibited
and are any substantive additions. Finally, after a period of ‘red' coding
the file is microfilmed and the hard copy destroyed. At this point the computer
index entry in MI5's central registry index is moved from the ‘Live Index'
to the `Research Index'.
The logic of the Commissioner becomes quite tortuous when he comes
to consider records held by MI5 which, but for the Security Service Act 1989,
would have been destroyed. ‘Temporary' files which do not become ‘permanent'
files would previously have been destroyed after three years so too would
`permanent' files on individuals and organisations erroneously opened - now
they are retained in case the Tribunal wants to see them at some undefined
point in the future.
MI5 holds records on those it vets
or places under surveillance. These fall into several broad categories: those
vetted for jobs in the Civil Service, defence industry, police and other sensitive
areas; those thought to be engaged in espionage on behalf of a foreign power,
and their perceived ‘supporters' or ‘sympathisers'; those suspected of involvement
in terrorism; a broad spectrum of those perceived to be in positions of power
and influence (including prospective parliamentary candidates, academics,
leading industrialists and journalists - ‘agents of influence' in CIA parlance);
and those considered to be ‘subversives' or a potential threat to national
security (this last category is said to contain more than 1 million names).
Over the three year period a total
of 102 people complained that inquiries were being made into their activities.
In 99 cases the Commissioner says ‘no such inquiries were made'. In the remaining
3 cases either inquiries had been made but had now ceased or the Tribunal
concluded: ‘that the Service has reasonable grounds at that time for deciding
to institute or continue inquiries about the complainant' (para.7). A further
total of 22 people complained that MI5 had disclosed information about them
in the vetting procedure - in only 2 cases had this been done and this was
justified because ‘the Service has reasonable grounds for believing the information
to be true' (para.7). The Commissioner's work receives little attention in
the press and parliament because it is widely viewed as giving little information
and providing token accountability. [Security Service Act 1989: Report of
the Commissioner for 1990, Rt Hon Lord Justice Stuart-Smith, Cm 1480, March
1991, HMSO; Report of the Commissioner for the Security Service for 1991,Cm
1946, HMSO, 1992; Report of the Commissioner for 1992, Security Service Act
1989, Rt Hon Lord Justice Stuart-Smith, March 1993, Cm 2174; Report of the
Commissioner for 1993, Rt Hon Lord Justice Stuart-Smith, March 1994, Cm 2523.]
MI5 first court appearance
In 1992, after a two month trial and
four days deliberating their verdict the jury at Caernarfon crown court found
a young Welshman, Sion Roberts, guilty of sending four incendiary devices
to prominent Conservatives and senior police officers. The same jury acquitted
two others, David Davies and Dewi Williams, of conspiracy to cause explosions
(Roberts was also acquitted on this charge). Dewi Williams had been described
by the prosecution of being the articulate leader of the group. This was the
first trial in which MI5 officers gave evidence in court. The trial arose
out of the second homes, arson campaign organised by Meibion Glyndwyr which
has produced more than 200 reported incidents since 1979. The prosecution
case rested on investigations by the North Wales police, its Special Branch
and Special Operation Unit and MI5 (the internal Security Service). The cornerstone
of the case against three men was the ‘terrorist cell theory' which the jury
rejected in throwing out serious charges of conspiracy.
In November 1991 there were 38 MI5
officers following Roberts at a protest march in Caernarfon. A few days earlier
over 20 MI5 officers kept Davies under observation. This surveillance was
supplemented by burglary and bugging (for this MI5 would need a warrant signed
by the Home Secretary). In November 1991 MI5 agents entered Roberts's flat
and placed bugs and hidden video cameras in it (some of the tapes were shown
to the jury). On 5 December they entered his flat again and the four officers
found explosive devices - Roberts' defence counsel unsuccessfully argued that
the agents planted this evidence because of their inability to find hard evidence.
These two operations were code-named ‘Seabird' and ‘Mountain'. [Secret Police
on trial, Philip Thomas, Planet, April 1993; Guardian, 10.3.93.]
MI5: structure:
Number: 2,235
Cost: about £150 million
HQ location: Thames House, London (this
new HQ cost £256 million) Director-General: Stella Rimmington
Despite the ending of the Cold War
there have been few changes in the structure of MI5. There has however been
a shifting of resources from `Cold War' sections to anti-terrorism and European
interests.
MI5 has several branches:
A Branch: with the following sections:
A1: operations (including bugging and
breakins)
A2: technical back-up (surveillance
devices)
A4: direct surveillance - watches,
including vehicles
A5: scientific research
B Branch: personnel
B1: recruitment
B2: personnel management
B3: general management services
B5: finance
C Branch: protective security
C1: security in Whitehall
C2: vetting government contractors
C3: vetting civil servants and Ministers
C4: security against terrorist attacks
F Branch: Domestic surveillance
F1: Communist Party (CPGB)
F2: trade unions
F3: [non-Irish terrorism]*
F4: agents in the CPGB and trade unions
F5: [Irish terrorism]*
F6: agents in radical groups and terrorist
organisations
F7: surveillance of political and campaigning
groups
* These roles have been moved to a
new Branch: T.
K Branch: Counter-intelligence (inc.
counter-espionage)
K1: potential espionage in government
departments
K2: monitors KGB and GRU (Soviet military
intelligence)
K3: recruitment of Soviet agents
K4: surveillance of Soviet diplomats,
trade delegations etc.
K5: recruitment of East European and
Chinese agents
K6: recruitment of other ‘hostile'
intelligence agents in UK
K7: investigation of penetration of
UK security and intelligence agencies including MI5.
K8: non-Soviet bloc counter-intelligence
S Branch: training and computer systems
S1: runs the Joint Computer Bureau
linked to other agencies including MI6.
S2: registry of files
S3: training
S4: supplies, travel arrangements.
T Branch: anti-terrorism
T1: Irish terrorism
T2: non-Irish terrorism
Special Branch:
Numbers: around 1.500
Cost: not known
Location: in London at the Metropolitan
Police HQ, New Scotland
Yard, London; in the provinces at police
force HQs.
Head: John A Howley, Deputy Assistant
Commissioner in the Metropolitan Police force.
The Special Branch is formally part
of the police force. It deals with counter-subversion, counter-terrorism,
and public order. Since 1992 its historical role of countering IRA terrorism
has been taken over by MI5.
A.1 MI6, the Secret Service or Secret Intelligence Service
MI6, or the Secret Service or Secret
Intelligence Service, was set up in 1911. It is responsible for gathering
intelligence and carrying out espionage operations outside of UK and its few
remaining colonies. The areas in which MI6 is traditionally proficient are
ex-colonies in Africa and Asia - where MI5's responsibility ended MI6 took
over. In Europe, in the postwar period, it developed a small but effective
intelligence system. The ending of the Cold War saw it extend its role in
Central and Eastern Europe with the Czech intelligence service a special ally.
MI6 is formally under the Foreign Office, most of its agents operate from
British embassies and high commissions abroad under diplomatic cover (it also
uses UK businessmen to gather intelligence).
Much of the postwar period was blighted
for MI6 by suspicions of `traitors' in its ranks. It was not until 1991 that
a former KGB colonel, Yuri Modin, confirmed that the `Fifth Man' recruited
by the Soviets in the 1930s was John Cairncross. The others were Kim Philby,
Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean and Sir Anthony Blunt. This ended years of speculation
that the `Fifth man' was Sir Roger Hollis, the head of MI5 between 1956 and
1965 [Guardian, 23.9.91; Sunday Times, 22.9.91.]
The current MI6 Head
David Spedding, 51, was been named
as the new head of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) in March 1994. He
will take over from the current chief, Sir Colin McColl, in September. Spedding
began his career as an intelligence officer in 1967 and spent his early years
training as an Arabist at the Middle East Centre for Arabic Studies, a Foreign
Office establishment located at Shemlan in Beirut. He then become second secretary
at the embassy in Beirut until he was - one of a number of SIS officers -
named by Kim Philby in 1971. Following Philby's disclosure he was transferred
to Santiago, Chile, where his two-year (1972-1974) posting coincided with
the CIA-backed overthrow of the Allende government by the military dictator,
General Pinochet.
In 1978 he was posted to Abu Dhabi
and between 1981 and 1983 he was at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in
London. He served as a counsellor in Amman from 1983-1986, a period when Jordan
was acting as a conduit to supply Iraq with western arms. He returned to London
in 1986 where he took responsibility for Middle East affairs and was the officer
in charge of covert intelligence operations during the Gulf War. He was also
in charge of a joint operational section that liaised with the Security Service,
MI5. In 1992 he became director of operations for MI6. [Guardian 5.3.94.;
Daily Telegraph 5.3.94.]
The Intelligence Service Bill
The Intelligence Service Bill was introduced
in parliament on 23 November 1993. It is intended to legitimise MI6 (also
known as the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), or the Intelligence Service).
The Bill also covers Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), founded
in 1946, at Cheltenham, which together the American National Security Agency
(NSA), monitors telecommunications throughout the world. This Bill, which
has been introduced in the House of Lords, supplements the Security Service
Act 1989 which covers MI5's activities. The provisions are in many ways the
same as in the 1989 Act with the proposed appointment of a Commissioner (a
senior judicial figure) reporting to the Prime Minister and a Tribunal to
which complaints can be made. Neither of which has engendered much public
confidence. The Bill does not cover the activities of the Defence Intelligence
Staff (DIS) or the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which is in the Cabinet
Office. Section 1 of the Bill sets out the role of MI6. Its functions are
defined as:
(a) to obtain and provide information
relating to the actions or intentions of persons outside the British Islands;
and
(b) to perform other tasks relating
to the actions or intentions of such persons... (in relation to) the interests
of national security, with particular reference to defence and foreign policies...the
interests of the economic well-being of the UK...or in support of the prevention
or detection of serious crime.
Or in plain language to: spy on ‘hostile'
foreign countries; to subvert and or undermine organisations or political
parties opposed to governments the UK supports; to gather economic intelligence
in ‘hostile' and ‘friendly' countries in order to further the interests of
UK businesses and capital; and to act in support of MI5, the Special Branch
and the police in countering terrorism, drugs, money laundering and illegal
immigration.
GCHQ role covers exactly the same objectives
- national security, economic well-being and serious crime - and its functions
are to:
monitor or interfere with electromagnetic,
acoustic and other emissions and any equipment producing such emissions and
to obtain and provide information derived from or related to such emissions
or equipment and from encrypted material (Section 3).
In other words the interception, transcription
or interference with the communications of foreign governments, military forces,
international companies and private individuals. The actual activities of
MI6 and GCHQ are only set out in regard to the ‘Authorisation of certain actions'
which are defined in Section 5. This says that if the Secretary of State (the
Foreign Secretary) issues a warrant: ‘No entry on or interference with property
or with wireless telegraphy shall be unlawful...'. The only limit to the issuing
of warrants is that actions should be of ‘substantial value' in MI5, MI6 and
GCHQ carrying out their defined (vague) functions. MI5 can execute warrants
in the UK on behalf of MI6 & GCHQ (except in the detection of serious
crime which is the preserve of the police). The Bill also sets out `Authorisation
for acts outside the British Islands' (in other countries). Section 7 states
that if an agent or official of MI6 acts, outside the UK, in a way that would
normally make then liable to prosecution under the criminal law, they will
not be liable if their actions are authorised by the Secretary of State. The
Secretary of State can authorise potentially ‘illegal' activities if they
are in pursuance of the functions of MI6. The Secretary of State is given
a general power to authorise these actions which can include a ‘particular
act or acts, acts of a description specified in the authorisation or acts
undertaken in the course of an operation so specified' and these may be limited
to a particular person, or persons, or they may not.
After years of speculation about the
need for parliamentary oversight of UK security and intelligence agencies
(along the lines of the US, Canadian and Australian models) the Bill introduces
the Intelligence and Security Committee (Section 10). This committee, on the
face of it, will be able to examine ‘the expenditure, administration and policy'
of MI5, MI6 and GCHQ. It will comprise six members drawn from either the House
of Commons or the House of Lords (excluding government Ministers). They will
be appointed by the Prime Minister, after consulting the Leader of the Opposition.
In practice the members of the committee are likely to exclude critics and
be comprised of trustworthy figures. Moreover, they will all be bound for
life by the Official Secrets Acts. Schedule 3 of the Bill sets limits on the
information to be given to the committee: all information passed to the committee
will be approved by the Secretary of State and may be refused if it is `sensitive
information'. ‘Sensitive information' (Schedule 3, section 4) covers the identification
and details of ‘sources of information', ‘operational methods', ‘particular
operations' which have been carried out or are being planned by the agencies,
and information which another government refuses to disclose. The only information
for which it appears there is a positive right that is covered by the Public
Records Act 1958 - that is, information that is at least 30 years old. [Intelligence
Services Bill (H.L.), 23.11.93, 20 pages, HMSO; The Security Service, 36 pages,
HMSO; Central Intelligence Machinery, 28 pages, HMSO; Commons Hansard, 30.11.93;
Guardian, 25.11.93.]
MI6: structure
Number: 2,300
Cost: about £150 million
HQ location: Vauxhall Cross, London
(a new HQ costing £93 million)
Head: known as "C", David Spedding
Structure:
MI6's work is divided in two main sections:
Directors of production - on a geographical
basis:
DP1: covers Europe. There is a Controller
for the Northern Area (P1) covering the Soviet Union and Scandinavia;
a Controller for the Western Area (P2)
responsible for France, Spain and Northern Africa; and
Controller for the Eastern Area (P3)
covering Germany, Austria and Switzerland.
DP2: Controller for the Middle East
(called P4)
DP3: Controller for Far East (P5) which
also covers Latin America.
DP4: responsible for London-based operations
Directors of Requirements:
In the following sections: political
affairs, air, naval, military, counter-intelligence, economic, financial,
GCHQ, and scientific.
D.1 Defence Intelligence Staff
The DIS was set up in the major reorganisation
of the UK defences and the Ministry of Defence in 1964. Each service (Army,
Navy, Air Force) have their own intelligence arms, the DIS provides the overall
assessment and evaluation.
Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS)
Numbers: 700
Cost: n.k.
HQ location: Main Building, Whitehall,
London SW1.
Head: Chief of Defence Intelligence
Staff (CDI)
DIS, set up in 1964, it gathers intelligence
on `threats' from surveillance, military attaches in UK embassies, SIGINT
from GCHQ, and from the US NSA.
The three main directorates are:
* Directorate of Management & Support
Intelligence
* Directorate of Economic & Logistic
Intelligence
* Directorate of Scientific & Technical
Intelligence
B.1 Government Communication Headquarters - GCHQ
GCHQ's role is officially described
in recruiting literature as being responsible for ‘ensuring the security of
British official and military communications ... and cryptographic equipment
and systems to protect these'. In theory it is sponsored by the Foreign Office
however most of its budget comes from the Ministry of Defence. It is part
of the worldwide SIGINT network first set up by the UK and the USA under the
UKUSA Treaty of 1946 - together with Canada, Australia and New Zealand (later
they were joined by West Germany, Denmark, Norway, Japan and South Korea).
The UK and USA are however the two key players. They have divided up the world
and monitor through tracking stations and satellites microwave and ground
telecommunications. Some of the links in the chain are the UK base at Agios
Nikolaos in Cyprus and the US satellite base at Pine Gap in Australia.
While one of its main tasks is to gather
intelligence from countries considered ‘hostile' it is by no means limited
to this.
Increasingly GCHQ gather economic intelligence
from `hostile' and `friendly' countries. It has also, from the mid-1980s,
supplied extensive surveillance inside the UK.
GCHQ: size and structure:
Number: 6.500 civilians plus 3.000
army and RAF signals specialists based in the agency's outstations.
Cost: officially £500 million
Location: Cheltenham, Gloucestershire.
Director: Sir John Ayde
Structure:
GCHQ has two main directorates:
Directorate of Organisation and Establishment
with a number of divisions:
C: overseas staff
E: personnel
F: finance and supply
G: management and general
M: mechanical engineering
Q: technical
R: security
Directorate of SIGINT:
H: cryptanalysis
J: special SIGINT
K: general SIGINT
S/T: statistical operations
W: search technology
X: computer services
Z: liaison
GCHQ also has: directors of communications
and communications security; a directorate of SIGINT plans, and a director
of plans and policy staff.
It is worth noting a development in
the late 1980s when a new special unit K20 was set up to monitor telephone
calls and the activities of radical groups and individuals within the UK.
It passes this information to the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in the
Cabinet Office.
GCHQ: A rare insight
In July 1991 Granada's ‘World in Action'
programme carried an interview with Robin Robison, an administrative officer
in the Joint Intelligence Unit (JIU) until 1990. Mr Robison, a Quaker, resigned
because of what he saw as the abuse of power by the intelligence agencies
in monitoring telephone calls, telexes and other phone transactions. The JIU
services the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) which collates and analyses
intelligence from MI5, MI6, GCHQ, and Defence Intelligence (DIS).
The programme revealed that GCHQ at
Cheltenham and its listening post at Bude in north Cornwall are routinely
gathering conversations quite unrelated to espionage. In the post Cold War
period the gathering of economic intelligence has moved to the fore both on
UK companies, competitors in Europe, and Third World countries. The supposedly
private communications of organisations like Rolls Royce, Marconi, British
oil and mining companies are also being intercepted.
Individuals whose action might embarrass
the government or state agencies have also been targeted. These include the
telephones of Lieutenant Robert Lawrence, the Falklands war hero whose story
was told in the film ‘Tumbledown' because of Ministry of Defence concern over
his claim for compensation; the Vatican and Roman Catholic archbishops to
evaluate their attitude to changes in Eastern Europe; Kathleen Tacchi-Morris,
the founder of Women for World Disarmament; east European trade unions; and
Campbell Christie, general secretary of the Scottish Trade Union Congress.
The interception of communications is not limited to individuals.
Communications satellites over the Atlantic, Indian Ocean and the Middle East
are routinely trawled through ‘standard baseband surveys' or all calls to
a particular dialling code are down loaded. The increased use of ‘keyword'
software now enables them to select and transcribe a greater volume of traffic.
The legality of this operation is highly questionable. The Interception of
Communications Act was passed in 1985 after pressure from the European Court
of Human Rights. It was supposed to place limits on those placed under surveillance
and the grounds for doing so. The Act placed the formal responsibility on
the Home Secretary to issue warrants but this GCHQ operation, run in conjunction
with the US National Security Agency, comes under the Foreign Secretary.
The central structure of intelligence
* Permanent Secretaries Committee on
the Intelligence Services (PSIS):
chaired by the Cabinet Secretary. Members
include: the Permanent Under Secretaries of the Foreign Office, the Home Office,
the Treasury, and the Chief of Defence Staff.
* Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO):
is based in the Cabinet Office. Analyst
and assessment staff prepare daily reports and long-term analyses. It sends
information to the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC).
* Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC):
started in 1936 and brought within
the Cabinet Office in 1957. A group of officials who filter information between
the experts and ministers. It has two overseas offshoots - JIC (G) based in
Bonn, chaired by the local MI6 station chief monitoring political and economic
developments in Central and Eastern Europe. JIC (C) based in Cyprus, monitoring
the Middle East.
JIC's members include the Coordinator
of Intelligence and Security, the heads of MI5, MI6, and GCHQ, the deputy
chief of Defence Staff responsible for intelligence, and the Chair and Deputy
Chair of the JIO assessment staff.
JIC also has a number of specialist
sub-committees (Current Intelligence Groups - CIGs).
The first half of JIC's meeting are
attended by the CIA and representatives of the Canadian and Australian intelligence
services. Weekly intelligence reports are sent to Minsters in the JIC Red
Book every Thursday morning.
* Coordinator of Intelligence and Security:
currently Gerald Walker. He reports
directly to the Prime Minister, and is responsible for ensuring the smooth
cooperation between the different agencies.
* Cabinet Committees
The government announced in May 1992
`in the interests of greater openness' the names and membership of Cabinet
Committees. These included the Ministerial Committees on:
- Defence and Overseas Policy (OPD);
- Nuclear Defence Policy (OPDN);
- European Security (OPDSE);
- Hong Kong and other dependent territories
(OPDK);
- Northern Ireland (NI);
- Intelligence Services (IS);
- Home and Social Affairs (EDH) and
- Ministerial Sub-Committees on:
+ European Questions (OPD(E));
+ Terrorism (OPD(T));
+ Drug Misuse (EDH(D)); and
+ Women's Issues (EDH(W), chaired by
the Secretary of State for Employment).
However, no details were given on ad-hoc
committees of which there were 140 in the last five year parliament on issues
like the poll tax. Nor were details given on the official inter-departmental
committees headed by Permanent Under-Secretaries (top civil servants) of which
there were 100 in the last parliament. It is these latter committees which
prepare all major policy reports for ministerial committees.
Details were given on the Ministerial
Committee on Intelligence chaired by the Prime Minister and charged with keeping
‘under review policy on the security and intelligence services' (the other
members being the Foreign Secretary, Home Secretary, Defence Secretary, and
Chancellor for the Duchy of Lancaster). But no details were announced on the
inter-departmental Electronic Security Committee, the Permanent Under-Secretaries
Committee on Security and Intelligence Services (PSIS) or the powerful Joint
Intelligence Committee (JIC).
* Security Commission
At the beginning of October the government
announced the appointment of three new members of the Security Commission:
Sir John Blelloch, KCB, Lord Lieutenant, Sir Derek Boorman, KCB and Sir Christopher
Curwen, KCMG. The Security Commission was established in 1964 to investigate
breaches of security and unauthorised leaks of information and to recommend
any changes in procedure. There are seven members of the Security Commission
from which three or four are usually chosen to form a panel to investigate
a particular breach of security.
Sir John Blelloch retired as Permanent
Under Secretary of State at the Northern Ireland Office in 1990. Sir Derek
Boorman was Chief of Intelligence at the Ministry of Defence 1985-8. Sir Christopher
Curwen is listed as having ‘recently retired as a Deputy Secretary in the
Cabinet Office'. In fact Sir Christopher was the Security and Intelligence
Co-ordinator in the Cabinet Office. His successor in this post is Gerald Warner,
a former Foreign Office official and member of the Police Complaints Authority.
Whitehall does not officially acknowledge
the name of the Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator or identify the names
of the heads of MI5 or MI6. The Director General of MI5 is Patrick Walker
and the Chief of MI6 (the overseas intelligence agency) is Sir Colin McColl.
[Downing Street press release 1.10.91; Guardian, 2.10.91.]
Telephone Tapping
Introduction
The only official figures for the interception
of communications (telephone-tapping, mail-opening and bugging) are now given
in an annual report by the Commissioner appointed under the 1989 Interception
of Communications Act. No figures are given for interception by the Government
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) nor for the use of telephone ‘metering'
- which logs calls made and the telephone numbers - and is widely used by
the police, Special Branch and MI5.
The number of warrants issued for telephone
tapping and mail-opening in 1993 was one of the highest since records began
in 1937. A total of 998 warrants were issued in England and Wales (covering
telephone tapping and mail-opening) to the Metropolitan Police Special Branch,
the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), and HM Customs and Excise.
The figure allegedly also includes
those issued to the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in Cheltenham
but the number of warrants issued by the Foreign Secretary - who is responsible
for GCHQ - are not published this is misleading. Past evidence of massive
trawling by GCHQ suggested that they monitor over 35.000 communications a
year (telephone, faxes etc). Nor are the figures for warrants issued by the
Northern Ireland Secretary of State published.
The figures for 1993 published in the
annual report of the Commissioner for the Interception of Communications Act
1985, Sir Robert Bingham, show that 893 warrants were issued for telecommunications
tapping and 105 for mail-opening - as these figures relate to ‘warrants' these
may refer to an individual or an organisation (through which many individuals
may be surveilled). The table below gives the figures for the past five years
and the past top numbers for warrants. This shows that the 1993 total was
the highest outside of the Second World War (1939- 941) and the 1948 dock
strike.
1939: 1002
1940: 1682
1941: 1042
1948: 973
1989: 458
1990: 515
1991: 732
1992: 874
1993: 998
The figure for Scotland was an all-time
high since the number of warrants issued was first published in 1967. The
number of warrants issued by the Secretary of State for Scotland in 1993 was
112 for telecommunications and 10 for mail-opening, a total of 122 warrants.
This surpasses not just the 92 warrants in 1992 but also the post-1967 high
of 75 during the 1984/5 miners strike. The figures for Scotland are:
1984: 75
1985: 68
1989: 64
1990: 66
1991: 82
1992: 92
1993: 122
The Commissioner reports states that
there had been in the ‘past a reluctance on the part of some [Scottish] police
forces to apply for warrants' - this has, the report says, now been rectified.
The Secretary General of the Scottish Trades Union Council, Campbell Christie,
commented: ‘this report will never cover interceptions without warrants..[it]
does not reflect the true extent of interceptions taking place'. Mr Christie
has begun a legal action against the UK government in the European Court of
Human Rights after a former official in the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)
based in the Prime Minister's office said that in 1992 he was the target of
mail and telex interceptions. The report states that there has been a significant
increase in the number of warrants issued to HM Customs, the National Criminal
Intelligence Service, MI5 (because of the anti-terrorist work it has taken
over from the Special Branch) and the Northern Ireland Office. It also says,
like the past two years, that no individuals and ‘only a very few organisations'
are placed under surveillance on the grounds that they are ‘subversive' (that
they are a threat to ‘parliamentary democracy or national security'). A disturbing
omission from the report is that, for the first time since the Commissioner
was appointed, no figures are given for the number of complaints made to the
Tribunal by the public are given. [Report of the Commissioner for 1992, Cm
2522, HMSO, March 1994; Tapping the Telephone, POEU pamphlet; Interception
of Communications in the UK, Cmnd 9438, 1985; State Research, no 18, June/July
1980; see also Statewatch, vol 1 no 4, vol 2 no 5, vol 3 no 5.]
New UK secrecy definitions
The UK has four Official Secrets Acts
- 1991, 1920, 1939 and 1989. These proscribe the ‘leaking' of information
on defence, intelligence and security setting out penalties (fines and prisons
sentences) for those who pass on secrets and those who publish them. In April
1994 the government announced a new system of classifying secret documents
known as the ‘protective security marking system'. The Prime Minister said
that the new system followed a review conducted in the light of the changing
nature of threats to national security. He said:
In recent years, the nature of the
threats to government security has changed. Whilst some of the traditional
threats to national security may have somewhat reduced, others have not. The
security of government is also increasingly threatened by for example theft,
copying and electronic surveillance, as well as by terrorism.
The new classification system still
has four categories (full-text given below). The language too has been modernised.
Markings are given to ‘assets' (including information) whose exposure or publication
would ‘compromise that asset or information'.
* The first is Top Secret: the old
definition related to ‘causing exceptionally grave damage to the nation',
the new one says:
the compromise of this information
or material would be likely: to threaten directly the internal stability of
the UK or friendly countries; to lead directly to widespread loss of life;
to cause exceptionally grave damage to the effectiveness or security of UK
or allied forces or to the continuing effectiveness of extremely valuable
security or intelligence operations; to cause exceptionally grave damage to
relations with friendly governments; to cause severe long-term damage to the
UK economy.
* The second Secret previously defined
as ‘causing serious injury to the interests of the nation' is now: the compromise
of this information or material would be likely: to raise international tension;
to damage seriously relations with friendly governments; to threaten like
directly, or seriously prejudice public order, or individual security or liberty;
to cause serious damage to the operational effectiveness or security of UK
or allied forces or the continuing effectiveness of highly valuable security
or intelligence operations; to cause substantial material damage to national
finances or economic and commercial interests.
* The third Confidential was ‘being
damaging to the interests of the nation' and is now: the compromise of this
information or material would be likely: materially to damage diplomatic relations
(i.e.: cause formal protest or other sanction); to prejudice individual security
or liberty; to cause damage to the operational effectiveness or security of
UK or allied forces or the effectiveness of valuable security or intelligence
operations; to work substantially against national finances or economic or
commercial interests; substantially to undermine the financial viability of
major organisations; to impede the investigation or facilitate the commission
of serious crime; to impede seriously the development or operation of major
government policies; to shut down or otherwise substantially disrupt significant
national operations.
* The fourth Restricted was ‘being
undesirable in the interests of the nation' and is now: the compromise of
this information or material would be likely to affect diplomatic relations
adversely; to cause substantial distress to individuals; to make it more difficult
to maintain the operational effectiveness or security of UK or allied forces;
to cause financial loss or loss of earnings potential to or facilitate improper
gain or advantage for individuals or companies; to prejudice the investigation
or facilitate the commission of crime; to breach proper undertakings to maintain
the confidence of information provided by third parties; to impede the effective
development or operations of government policies; to breach statutory restrictions
on the disclosure of information; to disadvantage government in commercial
or policy negotiations with others; to undermine the proper management of
the public sector and its operations.
The existing system is based on the
four security classifications plus ‘a complex range of privacy markings (eg:
‘Commercial in Confidence', ‘Management in Confidence'). What the new system
does is to abolish these privacy markings and incorporate the areas covered
by them into a classification system previously limited to defence and national
security. Thus government policy, the operations of the public sector, and
private financial and commercial interests are brought within the ambit of
‘official secrecy'. [Cabinet Office press release, 23.4.94.]
Intelligence Agencies and the North of Ireland
Introduction
On 8 May 1992, the British Home Secretary,
Kenneth Clarke, announced that the Security Service, MI5, was to be given
the lead responsibility for intelligence work against the IRA in Britain,
taking over from the police Special Branch. MI5 already had primary responsibility
for intelligence work in relation to loyalist (eg Ulster Volunteer Force,
Ulster Freedom Fighters) and international terrorism, as well as IRA activity
in Europe and elsewhere. The new policy reflects a substantial shift in the
priorities of British intelligence compared to the period of the Cold War.
Nearly half of MI5's 2.235 staff now work on the conflict over the North of
Ireland, at a annual cost of more than 80 million pounds. Most of this activity,
however, takes place in Britain.
In the North of Ireland itself, the
Royal Ulster Constabulary's Special Branch (RUC SB) plays the main role in
gathering intelligence and, in theory, has overall responsibility for policing
and intelligence work. It is by far the largest agency in the field with a
staff of 660 running hundreds of paid informers, but it works alongside three
other bodies: MI5, Military Intelligence (intelligence units of the British
Army) and the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6). MI5 is thought to have an
active staff of about 100 in Ireland, most of whom are based in the North.
The British Army has a number of units mainly concerned with surveillance
and intelligence analysis, but it also runs informers and has operational
control over the elite Special Air Service (SAS) which has killed around 50
people including 30 IRA volunteers, since 1969.
The Security Service, MI5
The head of MI5 in the North of Ireland
is known as the Director and Co-ordinator of Intelligence (Northern Ireland)
(DCI (NI)) and was, until June 1994, John Deverell.* The DCI (NI) sits on
MI5's Board in London and reports directly to the Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland. He also chairs the Northern Ireland Security Committee attended by
representatives of the British Army, RUC and government ministers and sits
on the Joint Intelligence Committee in London - he is reported to have easy
access to the Prime Minister. Deverell was at one time tipped to become head
of MI5 but his career was damaged by revelations concerning the WARD and SCREAM
undercover operations in Germany which were designed to establish informers
in expatriate Irish communities throughout the world. These operations clearly
breached the agreement between the German and British authorities regarding
the scope of British intelligence work in Germany. In an embarrassing security
leak, An Phoblacht/Republican News published documents detailing the two operations
and naming Deverell in 1989.
MI5's headquarters, known as The Department,
is based at Stormont, on the site of the old Stormont parliament (suspended
when Direct Rule from London was introduced in 1972) on the fringes of east
Belfast. It has two operational bases in Belfast city centre, one at River
House in High Street and the other at Churchill House, Victoria Square. The
latter is the centre for electronic surveillance, including telephone monitoring,
for which MI5 receives assistance from the Cheltenham-based Government Communications
Headquarters. GCHQ goes under the name of Composite Signals Organisation in
the North and Diplomatic Telecommunications Maintenance Service in the South.
MI5 also retains offices at Army Headquarters
in Lisburn and at Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) HQ in Dundonald (east Belfast).
While in theory the RUC has overall
responsibility for counter-terrorism, in practice MI5 is in the stronger position
of power and influence over British policy. Its links to RUC Special Branch
are via a small network of Security Liaison Officers.
Secret Intelligence Service, MI6
During the earliest years of the current
conflict, the British government favoured the use of MI6 in the North of Ireland
(and in the South). On the basis of countering IRA bombing campaigns in Britain,
MI5 pushed for a presence in the North and from 1973 onwards began to build
itself organisationally. From that time onwards, MI6 has played only a minor
role. However, that role has had considerable political and intelligence significance.
It was a senior MI6 officer, Maurice
Oldfield, who was appointed as Security Co-ordinator for Northern Ireland
in October 1979. (Less than a year later, Oldfield was removed from this position
because, as Mrs. Thatcher's claimed, he had ‘confessed' to being homosexual.)
It was also an MI6 agent (Michael Oatley) who acted as Mrs. Thatcher's direct
link to the republican leadership during the 1981 hunger strike, apparently
over the heads of MI5 and the Northern Ireland Office. The same agent was
involved in the latest discussions with Sinn Fein representatives, revealed
in the autumn of last year (1993).
By the late 1970s, most MI6 agents
had been taken over by RUC SB or MI5, and MI6 itself had withdrawn from RUC
and Army headquarters, although it retained an office at Stormont. MI6 is
thought to have an operational staff of about 25 in Ireland as a whole, split
between the Stormont office, an office at Army HQ Lisburn and the British
Embassy in Merrion Road, Dublin.
RUC Special Branch
RUC Special Branch is formally constituted
as the RUC's E Department. It is headed by an Assistant Chief Constable (Brian
Fitzsimons*) who presides over an organisation subdivided by function and
three regions (Belfast, North and South). E1 looks after vetting of personnel,
internal security, the supply of under cover vehicles and security of communications
(mail and telecommunications). E2 is the department responsible for legal
liaison, the interrogation centres and SB activity in prisons. E3 collates
all intelligence gathered by field operators, informers and uniformed officers.
It is split into three sections. E3A evaluates intelligence on republicans,
while E3B and E3C are concerned with loyalists and leftists and other groups
(eg animal rights) respectively.
E4 is the operations division which
carries out the day-to-day field work of intelligence gathering. E4A carries
out person-to-person surveillance and achieved a certain notoriety through
‘shoot-to-kill' actions in the 1980s which were the subject of the Stalker
inquiry. Technical surveillance - the installation of bugs, tracking devices
etc. - is the responsibility of E4B. Finally, E4C and E4D carry out photographic
and video surveillance.
Military Intelligence
The British Army runs its own intelligence
operation in the North of Ireland under the name of Northern Ireland Command
Military Intelligence (NICMI). Very little is known about NICMI and its organisational
structure. On the operational side, it is reputedly made up of staff from
the SAS, the Royal Corps of Signals, the Royal Air Force (which pilots helicopter
surveillance), 14th Intelligence Company and Field Research Units (or Forward
Reconnaissance Units). These units were set up by Commander of Land Forces
Major General Glover in 1980. All intelligence from Army sources is stored
on the Crucible computer at Lisburn HQ which is maintained by 12th Intelligence
and Security Company.
The role of military intelligence has
come to light in three recent incidents. The two corporals attacked and killed
at the funeral of one of those who in turn had been killed by loyalist Michael
Stone's attack on the burial of the three IRA volunteers, shot by the SAS
in Gibraltar, were part of the Signals Corps. 14th Intelligence Company killed
three men robbing a bookmakers' shop in Belfast's Falls Road in January 1990.
While it was claimed they had stumbled across the robbery, other reports suggest
that the men were deliberately targeted because the under cover unit thought
they had acquired intelligence maps of West Belfast targets while robbing
a car outside a bar. More significant is the case of Brian Nelson. Nelson
worked for FRU for ten years. During this time he was the intelligence officer
for the loyalist group, the Ulster Defence Association. This gave military
intelligence direct knowledge of all UDA operations, including killings and
the large shipment of arms from South Africa in 1989.
Co-ordination
Since the early years of the current
conflict in Ireland, there has been rivalry and conflict between MI5 and MI6,
as well as between the British military and the RUC. The co-ordination of
intelligence agencies has therefore been a long-standing issue.
In the late 1970s, the first of three
Tasking and Coordination Groups was established. Based at Castlereagh in Belfast,
the TCG proved so successful in ‘tasking the SAS for executive action' (i.e.
identifying targets for the SAS to eliminate) that two more were established
soon afterwards for the RUC's other regions - one at Gough Barracks, Armagh,
and the other in Derry. The TCGs combine the intelligence of RUC SB, MI5 and
the Army, allowing the linking together of informer-based intelligence and
the surveillance and ambush activities of undercover units. The Army representative
on TCGs is almost always a veteran of an SAS or 14 Intelligence Company tour.
The bulk of intelligence available to the TCGs comes not from MI5, FRU or
14 Intelligence Co., but from RUC SB.
A review of policies governing the
use of informers and the sharing of intelligence, conducted by a retired MI5
officer, led to the setting up of the Provincial Executive Committee in 1992.
This provides top level co-ordination between the intelligence agencies within
the North and includes the Army's Commander of Land Forces, the head of RUC
SB, a Deputy Chief Constable with special responsibility for police/Army liaison,
and MI5's Director and Coordinator of Intelligence.
The RUC Chief Constable, Sir Hugh Annesley,
would like to see co- ordination taken further, however, with the establishment
in Britain of a National Anti-Terrorist Unit. He proposes that the unit would
have four concerns. The first would be the cultivation of informants, the
second with the gathering, analysis and assessment of intelligence, the third
with providing an operational capacity to respond to such intelligence, and
the fourth, a training, legal and support service wing.
The unit, Annesley suggests, would
incorporate the Security Service, the Metropolitan Police Special Branch and
Anti-Terrorist Unit, with a significant input from provincial CID and Special
Branches. It would also include military and customs personnel with the capacity
to co-opt specific skills from other agencies or departments as appropriate.
The National Anti-Terrorist Unit would provide a single police and intelligence
focal point for liaison with the RUC, the Garda (the police in the Republic
of Ireland) and the police forces and intelligence services of Europe and
North America. The head of the unit would have a line of command to the Home
Secretary but with direct access to the Prime Minister. A National Anti-Terrorist
Unit of the kind envisaged by Annesley would involve MI5 as a partner, not
as the lead authority.
* Killed on 2 June 1994 while travelling
from the North of Ireland to a conference at Fort George, Scotland. 25 intelligence
personnel and four RAF crew were killed when their Chinook helicopter crashed
on the Mull of Kintyre. Among the dead were ten members of RUC SB, including
the head of SB, 2 regional heads and the divisional heads of E1, E2, E3, E3A,
E3B, and E4. 5 MI5 agents also perished in the crash along with a British
Army colonel, three Intelligence Corps lieutenant colonels, and five majors.
It is widely acknowledged that the crash killed the upper echelons of the
intelligence agencies in the North of Ireland, including key members of the
Provincial Executive Committee.
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