A
Consequentialist Argument against Torture Interrogation of
Terrorists
Jean
Maria Arrigo, Ph.D.
Joint
Services Conference on Professional Ethics
Abstract
Much support for
torture interrogation of terrorists has emerged in the public forum, largely
based on the “ticking bomb” scenario.
I draw from the historical record, criminology, organizational theory,
social psychology, and interviews with military professionals to envisage an
official program of torture interrogation.
The quintessential element of program design is a sound causal model
relating input to output. I explore
three, increasingly realistic models of how torture interrogation leads to
truth: the animal instinct model, the cognitive failure model, and the data
processing model. These models
expose the rational, mid-level social processes that lead from an official
program of torture interrogation to breakdowns in key institutions—health care,
biomedical research, police, judiciary, military, and government. Stated most starkly, the damaging social
consequences of a program of torture interrogation evolve from institutional
dynamics that are independent of the original moral rationale. Further, a legal, regulated program
cannot eliminate use of rogue torture interrogation services, because they still
serve to circumvent moral and procedural constraints on the official
program.
In my view, it
remains for consequentialist advocates of a
Introduction
Since the
September 2001 terrorist attacks on the
Ethicist John
Rawls proposed that consequentialist moral argument for a program of action
should include assessment of the
practices required to implement that program. For with careful attention to
implementation, there is less danger of adopting means that do not actually
reach the desired ends.[5] As a social psychologist, this is the
course I pursue. I pass over
foundational issues, such as the definition of “torture” and the morality of
torture per se. I do not reach as
far as state-level issues, such as
international covenants banning torture. Rather, I draw from criminology,
organizational theory, the historical record, and my own interviews to explore
the design, implementation, and consequences of such a program. This strategy makes visible the
mid-level social processes that lead from an official program of torture
interrogation to serious dysfunctions in major institutions—health care and
biomedical research, police and the judiciary, and the military and
government.
Policy studies
demonstrate that the quintessential element of program design and implementation
is a sound causal model relating input to output.[6] Can we send only key terrorists into the
torture chamber and produce at the other end only knowledge of terrorist plans
and harmless prisoners? For
orderliness of exposition, I present three, increasingly realistic models of how
torture interrogation leads to truth: (I) the animal instinct model, (II) the
cognitive failure model, and (III) the data processing model. The inadequacies of each model lead on
to the next, with increasing involvement and compromise of key social
institutions—that is to say, with
unintended inputs and unintended outputs of great consequence. To these causal models, I append (IV)
the rogue models of outsourcing torture interrogation to foreign or illegal
information services, without regard for causal explanation.
In
outline:
Practical
Mid-Level Considerations for
Programs
of Torture Interrogation of Terrorist Suspects
Causal
Models of How Torture Leads to Truth 1. Animal Instinct
Model In
order to escape pain or death, the subject complies with the demands of
the torturer. The model fails
when (a) physiological damage impairs ability to convey the truth and (b)
torturers cannot control subjects’ interpretation of
pain. |
Prototypical
Interrogation
Scenarios 1. "Ticking
bomb" Subjects
divulge their plans under sufficient torture. |
Special
Institutional Requirements 1. Assistance of medical
practitioners, before, during, and after torture
sessions. |
2. Cognitive Failure
Model he
physiological and psycho-logical stress of torture renders the subject
mentally incompetent to muster deception or to maintain his own
interpretations of pain. The
model fails due to (a) time delays and (b) torturers’ inability to
distin-guish truth from deceit or delirium. |
2. Fanatics, Martyrs, and
Heroes Subjects
are resistant to coercion by means of pain or threat. |
2A. Biomedical and psychological
research into methods, detection, and concealment of
torture. 2B. Establishment of a torture
interrogation unit, with training of torturers in sophisticated
methods. |
3. Data Processing
Model Torture
provokes ordinary subjects to yield data (both true and false) on an
opportunistic basis, for comprehensive analysis across subjects. The model fails when (a) analysts
are overwhelmed by data and (b) torture motivates many new terrorists. |
3. Dragnet
Interrogations Numerous
weaker or less committed terrorists, associates, and innocents are
detained and interrogated. |
3A.
Coordination of torture agencies with the police. 3B. Coordination of of torture
agencies with the judiciary.
3C. Accommodation of torture units
within the military and the government. |
Non-Causal
Models of How Torture Leads to Truth 4. Rogue Models Torture
is emotionally, culturally, or historically inseparable from other
methods, or it is one tactic among many in a hit-or-miss approach. The
model fails when (a) biases and ulterior motives of torturers invalidate
results or (b) torture tactics empower competing political or criminal
entities. |
Prototypical
Interrogation Scenarios 4A. Indiscriminately Brutal Foreign
Intelligence Agencies 4B. Covert
4C. “Information Services” of Organized
Crime. |
Special
Institutional Requirements 4. Discreet government and military
liaisons. |
I. The Animal Instinct Model of Truth
Telling
The January 2001
cover of The Atlantic Monthly asked in large print, "MUST WE TORTURE?" Terrorism analyst Bruce Hoffman from
Rand Corporation suggested we must.
He reported sympathetically on his meeting with a Sri Lankan intelligence
officer—"Thomas"— whose terrorist opposition “eclipse[d] even bin Laden’s al
Qaeda in professionalism, capability, and determination." In one vignette,[7]
Thomas’s
unit had apprehended three terrorists who, it suspected, had recently planted
somewhere in the city a bomb that was then ticking away, the minutes counting
down to catastrophe.... He asked
them where the bomb was. The
terrorists—highly dedicated and steeled to resist interrogation—remained
silent....So Thomas took his pistol from his gun belt, pointed it at the
forehead of one of them, and shot him dead. The other two, he said, talked
immediately; the bomb, which had been placed in a crowded railway station and
set to explode during the evening rush hour, was found and defused, and
countless lives were saved.
In this
compelling ticking-bomb scenario, terrorists give up their secrets in a timely
manner to escape immediate pain or death, a causal pattern I label the animal
instinct model. Ancient Greek
courts placed great faith in testimony obtained through torture of slaves. As Aristotle explained, free men can
reason about the personal consequences of truth and false testimony, and they
will testify, even under torture, to their long-term advantage; but slaves,
deprived of reason, are compelled by their feelings to meet the torturer’s
demands so as to terminate the pain.[8] Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz
adds a moral element: “...you want
to cause the most excruciating, intense, immediate pain” but “with minimum
lethality.”[9]
The animal
instinct model requires medical assistance at the torture site. As explained by neurologist Lawrence
Hinkle, who examined Korean War veterans after communist "brain-washing":[10]
The human brain,
the repository of the information that the interrogator seeks, functions
optimally within the same narrow range of physical and chemical conditions that
limit the functions of human organs in general.... Any circumstance that impairs the
function of the brain potentially affects the ability to give information as
well as the ability to withhold it.
In
particular, the interrogation fails if the terrorist loses consciousness before
revealing his plans.
Assistance
of Health Professionals in Torture Interrogation
Routine
participation of medical personnel in state-sponsored torture interrogation has
been documented worldwide. Medical
professionals determine the types of torture a person can endure, monitor the
person for endurance under torture, resuscitate the person, treat the person to
prepare for further torture, and administer non-therapeutic drugs. To cover up torture, physicians falsify
health certificates, autopsy reports, and death certificates.[11] Studies of survivors show medical
participation in the range of 20% to 40% of cases, or even "the majority".[12] Coercive interrogation manuals, such as
the 1983 edition of the
To obtain the
physicians’ perspective, the Indian Medical Association surveyed a random sample
of 4,000 members.[14] Of the fifth who responded, 58% believed
torture interrogation permissible; 71% had come across a case of probable
torture; 18% knew of health
professionals who had participated in torture;16% had witnessed torture
themselves; and 10% agreed that false medical and autopsy reports were sometimes
justified.
Government-sponsored torture generates deep conflicts within medical
communities and between governments and their medical communities. In
Proponents of a
The larger lesson
here is that a national security rationale for torture does not suspend, without
tumult and schisms, the ethics codes of professions whose participation is
required. Judging from the
experience of other countries, similar turmoil might be anticipated in clinical
psychology, law, and journalism.[21]
II. The Cognitive Failure Model of Truth
Telling
A greater
obstacle to torture interrogation than bodily frailty of the subject is the
mental resistance of fanatics, martyrs, and heroes to coercion. A former
In 1979 the [TNP]
team captured Nalan Gurtas. She had
personally killed 32 Turkish National Police officers.... Trying to obtain
intelligence out of one of the most violent people on earth is a bit of
trouble.... She screamed, spat, kicked, ripped up her holding facility, refused
to talk....She tried to cut her wrists with a plastic knife; she ran full force
with her head onto the wall. She
threw feces at all of us. Then the word came down to go to Level 1 [i.e., potentially fatal torture]. .... She stayed silent.... [During
transport] she tried to jump from the speeding vehicle...after laughing she
loved shooting police and Americans.
She was between the car and the ground when they fired 32 rounds into
her, which was one hell of a hard shot to make.....
Modern psychology
maps the intractability of the psyche.
In general, people tend to react against those who constrain their
freedom of action (reactance theory,[23]
for instance, by substituting untraceable acts of sabotage. People tend to become more dogmatic and
tenacious in their belief systems when reminded of their mortality (terror
management theory).[24] And under extreme stress, as during a
car crash, rape, or battlefield injury, people may dissociate, that is,
experience the episode as if from a distance, temporarily protected from pain
and awareness of consequences (traumatic stress theory).[25] For such reasons, Copher said he tried to
interview terrorist suspects “before any heavy handed ex-Turkish farmer slapped
them around.”[26]
Even under the
Nazis, torture interrogation failed to break dozens of high state officials and
military commanders involved in late-war plots to assassinate Hitler. According to Peter Hoffman’s History of
the German Resistance: 1933-1945:[27]
Six
months from the start of their investigations the Gestapo still had nothing like
precise knowledge of the resistance movement.......This lack of information and
knowledge is all the more astounding in that Himmler's men employed every means
to extract confessions.... Moreover
all forms of torture were used without hesitation....
Hoffman
attributes the failure of the Gestapo to the “fortitude of their victims.”
Closer to home
for Americans, during the months and years of North Vietnamese torture of
American POWs, Commander James Stockdale estimated that under 5% of his 400
fellow American airmen succumbed to North Vietnamese demands for anti-American
propaganda statements.[28]
These examples expose the bigotry in the expectation that key
enemy terrorists will readily give up their plans and associates under torture.
The animal
instinct model ultimately fails because the physiological experience of pain is
mediated by individual and cultural interpretation. Anthropologists identify the “punitive
pain” envisioned by the torturer as only one of several competing
interpretations. In addition to the
valor of “military pain;” exemplified by Nalan Gurtas, German resistors, and
Stockdale, we recognize the “medical pain” of surgery, the “athletic pain” of
the marathon; and the “sacrificial pain” of martyrs.[29] A psychological study of 79 Palestinians
detained by the Israelis identified seven meanings of their prison abuse, such
as “struggle between strength and weakness” of character; “heroic fulfillment”
of their role as liberators of their people; a “developmental task;” and “return
to religion.” [30]
In the cognitive
failure model of truth telling, torture renders the subject cognitively
incapable of maintaining his or her own interpretation of pain. As understood by contemporary criminal
psychology, overwhelming physical and mental stress create a state of
disorientation in which the subject is unable to maintain a position of
self-interest and becomes suggestible or compliant under interrogation.[31]
Similarly, in the 15th to 18th Centuries, European courts employed juridical
torture in the belief that bodily suffering eliminates self-will, which accorded
with Catholic asceticism. Absent
self-will, the accused was presumed to expose the truth in involuntary testimony
or nonverbal signs.[32]
In contrast to
the resistance of Stockwell’s airmen to North Vietnamese tortures, only 5% of
the repatriated American POWs held
by the Chinese in the Korean War decisively resisted the cognitive
disorientation—and reorientation— tactics of the Chinese; 15% “participated” to
the extent they were court-martialed or dishonorably discharged. The “brain-washing” regimen of the
chinese included solitary confinement, lack of stimulus, unremitting observation
by guards, sleep deprivation, ridicule, pressure to confess to unstated crimes,
and interminable instruction in Marxism and Maoism, as well as deprivations and
threats. “Physical abuse and
mistreatment were frequently the results of resistance, but seldom the prelude
to participation,” “with only 3% of the “Participators” severely mistreated.[33] Here I pass over a considerable
literature pointing to the greater efficacy of noncoercive interrogation based
on social skills: subtlety and finesse of interrogation,[34]
sympathy with the subject,[35]
appeal to the subject’s self interest,[36]
and outright deceit and trickery.[37]
The cognitive
failure model demands cutting edge biomedical research into techniques of
torture, to stay ahead of savvy terrorist organizations, and research into
concealment and detection of torture, to stay ahead of human rights
monitors. Further, it demands a
corps of trained torturers to apply the precision torture technology. I explore these two institutional
requirements next.
Biomedical
Research for Torture Interrogation
Twentieth Century
researchers developed numerous techniques to induce disorientation: psychiatric-pharmacological substances,
electroshock, electromagnetic resonance, and others.[38]
But how could torture-interrogation research proceed in the
Consider a Cold
War strategy for a program of similarly stigmatized research, the CIA's mind
control Project MKULTRA. A 1977
Senate investigation into CIA research on human subjects disclosed that the CIA
had simply contracted with
researchers at over 80 universities, hospitals, chemical and
pharmaceutical companies, and research institutes through a front funding
agency. The Human Ecology Society,
as it was called, was co-founded by the neurologist Hinkle who had examined the
POWs “brainwashed” in Korea.[39] One MKULTRA subproject sought
"[s]ubstances which will enhance the ability of individuals to withstand
privation, torture and coercion during interrogation...." Another called for three research teams
to compare various combinations of "straight interrogation, hypnosis, and drugs
on subjects who had denied allegations known to be true." Admiral Stansfield Turner, then Director
of Central Intelligence, stated: “I believe we all owe a moral obligation to
these researchers and institutions to protect them from any unjustified
embarrassment or damage to their reputations which revelations of their
identities might bring.[40] The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the
identities should not be revealed for security reasons.[41] The CIA research strategy therefore
remained viable.
The "war on
terrorism" has produced a related research strategy. The U.S. Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) hosted an invitation-only conference on March 11-13,
2002, called "Scientists Helping America." his According to a widely broadcast
DARPA call for submissions, "The primary focus of the conference is to tap into
new ideas of scientists and inventors...."
"Luminaries" from industry
and academia are invited to "come and interact with real special operation
forces including US Navy SEALS and US Army Green Berets." [42]
In a 1995
interview, I remarked to (now deceased) biological psychologist John Liebeskind
on the potential contributions of his pain management research to torture
interrogation. In most fields of
animal experimentation, anesthetics and analgesics are administered to mask the
experience of injury; however, pain management researchers intentionally induce
pain in laboratory animals to study the mechanisms of pain. Liebeskind, a Fellow of the National
Academy of Sciences and a great humanist, replied with candor and insight:[43]
I
don’t think I am or would be in a good or well informed position to assess the
ethical consequences of any military project I might be asked to help with. They wouldn’t tell me the truth (and I
certainly wouldn’t know if they had or not), and I wouldn’t really understand
all the ramifications even if they did or thought they did. So if we are developing something
military and are in competition with other countries, I would feel an "us versus
them" dilemma, and there surely aren’t very many "thems" I would trust more than
us.
Biomedical
applications to torture interrogation may have a humanitarian theme. A neuroscientist recently developed a
“brain fingerprinting” technique.
Words or pictures relevant to an event are flashed onto a computer
screen. Measurement of the
subject’s brain-wave responses to words or pictures flashed onto a computer
screen determine whether the subject has knowledge of corresponding events.[44]
Copher suggested that we “use the brain fingerprint to find out
who the terrorists are, then we
torture them...,” thus avoiding torture of innocents—but, warned that, “like the
polygraph, the machine would have a wide range of [desirable and undesirable]
effects.”[45]
Israel exhibits
the motive for torture research to stay ahead of savvy enemies. A former Palestinian prisoner proudly
explained: “We learned about all
the types of ill-treatment and the techniques that the secret police use, and we
learned to observe the behavior of enemy officers during our interrogation.”[46] Turkey exhibits the motive for research
into concealment and detection of torture to stay ahead of human rights
monitors. The European Union
Commission postponed Turkey’s admission into the European Union because of the
flow of torture victims from Turkey.
To gain the political and economic advantages of membership, Turkey
attempted to develop torture techniques that leave no medical trace. European forensic experts, meanwhile,
employed successively more refined methods of detection, such as bone
scintigraphy, ultrasonography, CAT scans, and MRI’s.[47] Thus develops the race between
techniques of torture and techniques of resistance and detection.
Torture spreads
to foreign governments through exchange of torture technology.
Argentina gave classes in torture to Latin American military
officers, and Brazilian torturers trained Chileans.[48] The School of the Americas, with its
coercive interrogation manuals, was widely known as a training school for Latin
American dictators during the Cold War.
Amnesty International cites the United States as the largest
international supplier of electroshock weapons—stun guns, electro-shock batons,
and the like—to governments that practice electro-shock torture (for instance,
$3 million worth to Saudi Arabia in 1990).[49]
Another
unintended consequence of biomedical research on torture is the opportunity for
secret, illegal research on human subjects for other purposes. Administrators of torture interrogation
programs cannot prevent alternative
uses by their own biomedical scientists, who have negotiating power over
valuable resources.[50] Historically, government-sponsored
ethics investigations of the CIA’s mind control Project MKULTRA and the
Department of Energy’s radiation studies exposed extraneous, excessive, and
criminal human subjects research.[51]
Similarly, as
will be seen later, torture interrogation is a resource that could not be denied
to certain military, police, and government agencies for their own
applications.
Establishment
of a Torture Interrogation Unit
Political
scientist Harold William Rood, who for ten years taught field interrogation of
prisoners of war in military intelligence schools, explained the
institutionalization challenge as follows.
Many agencies must coordinate in a counterterrorist operation. Reliability and accountability are
therefore essential. Outlaws and
madmen cannot be hired as torturers by an otherwise orderly agency. The torturers have to be well trained
and professional: "To deliberately
torture a person over a period of six weeks is asking a lot of human beings. And
therefore you have to recruit them very carefully." This is the work of a highly trained
team of interrogators.[52]
The Los Angeles Times recently reported a former
counter-terrorism official as saying that one of bin Laden’s top deputies,
captured in March 2002, "will be put through the ringer for days and weeks....It
will take at least 96 hours to get him to spill everything....If not, they will
keep going...."[53]
Training programs
have been studied through interviews with former torturers in Greece,[54]
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay,[55]
Nicaragua,[56]
and Israel,[57]
to name a few. As a composite
picture, trainees are typically selected on the basis of their ability to endure
hardship and pain, for correct political beliefs, trustworthiness, and
obedience. Often the young, the
lower class, or the poorly educated are recruited, or even kidnapped. Brutal training at the outset
desensitizes trainees to their own pain, suffering, and humiliation. Confinement and initiation rites isolate
them from prior relationships.
Constant physical and psychological intimidation instill obedience. Trainees first learn torture through
social modeling in witness and guard roles. They usually experience tension between
their new roles and their previous values, and they variously resort to denial,
psychological dissociation, alcohol, or drugs. The efficacy of shame tactics tends to
lead, as with the Israeli General Security Services treatment of Palestinians,
to sexual tortures, which in turn contribute to stigmatization and corruption of
torturers. Training programs use
dehumanization and scapegoating of victims to relieve the bad self-image
experienced by many torturers.
Criminologist
Ronald Crelinsten, who studies the career paths of torturers, writes movingly of
their travails in the closed world of the torture unit. "The world of conventional morality and
human decency....has been largely replaced by a new morality where
disobedience"— including refusal to torture friends—"means punishment, disgrace,
humiliation,...or even death."[58] Alistair Horne, historian of the Battle
of Algiers, concluded that torture "tends to demoralise the inflictor even more
than his victim, and he gave harrowing examples of psychological impairment from
the psychiatric record. The French
negotiator for the final peace settlement with Algeria, Louis Joxe,
grieved: "I shall never forget the
young officers and soldiers whom I met who were absolutely appalled by what they
had to do...."[59] After the fall of the Pinochet regime in
Chile, the navy and air force did not take back officers who had worked in the
secret service but considered them to be “defiled.”[60]
The utiliarian
argument for torture interrogation, therefore, must justify the additional
sacrifice of the torturers—made vulnerable to "perpetration-induced traumatic
stress,"[61]
severe social stigma, and possibly spiritual turmoil—or develop some
hitherto-unknown transcendent regimen for training and after-care of
torturers. This sacrifice should be
expanded to include also families, where secrecy, stress, and stigmatization
take their toll over decades, and support staff—secretarial, custodial, and
maintenance. As Copher commented:
“Although our team [of liaison officers] could become accustomed to the [Middle
Eastern counterterrorist] interrogation process, the secretaries that received
our hand-written analysis and interrogation observations were badly shocked.”[62]
Rood further
cautioned that it would be difficult to set up a program for torture
interrogation without unintentionally incorporating an inside agent of the
terrorists.[63] Counterterrorist agencies depend on
informants. As in police detective
units with official informant programs, there is the perennial risk that the
informant will corrupt the agent and reverse roles, so that the informant
becomes the handler and the agent becomes the paid informer.[64] Recently, mafioso James "Whitey"
Bulger, unprosecuted murderer of 11
FBI informants, was found to have been running his own agents inside the
FBI—including FBI Special Agent John Connolly, whose opposition to organized
crime had raised him to eminence.[65]
Considerations of futility are thus added to the sacrifice of personnel in a
cost-benefits analysis.
III. The Data Processing Model for Knowledge
Acquisition
The cognitive
failure model for fanatics, heroes, and martyrs alerts us to the fact that
torture interrogation provides only data, not actionable knowledge. Commander James Stockdale ordered his
fellow American POWs in Vietnam to
“resist to the point of permanent injury or loss of mental faculty, and
then fall back on deceit and distortion.”
The standard of truth for intelligence agencies is not the one-shot
revelation, which is always suspect, but convergent analyses of far-ranging
data.
The French
General Paul Aussaresses, chief intelligence officer in the Battle for Algiers
from 1955 to 1957, credits his large-scale, merciless, torture interrogation
campaign with crushing the Algerian insurgency and stopping terrorist
bombings. Aussaresses’ name is
often brought in to support the ticking bomb argument, but his memoir records
cases of terrorists dying under torture with their secrets or exasperating him
to the point of murdering them himself.[66] He did not run a small-scale, precision,
torture-interrogation program, as envisioned by advocates in the U.S. He had an informant for each city block
in the native section of Algiers.
Altogether, thirty to forty percent of the men were arrested and
interrogated during the war, frequently under electrical shock to the sexual
organs.[67] Aussaresses ran a dragnet interrogation
program, which swept up the peripherally involved and the uninvolved along with
terrorist leaders.
Dragnet torture
interrogation is the norm. Soviet
historians estimate that between 1936 and 1939 the Soviet government arrested 5%
to 10% of the population, so as to suppress political opposition. Under severe interrogations, with
beatings, sleep deprivation, and isolation, almost everyone confessed, thereby
providing public justification for the arrests.[68] The widespread torture interrogation
programs of Latin American dictatorships during the “dirty wars” against
communism are well known. Between
1987 and 1994, the Israeli General Security Service officially interrogated
23,000 Palestinians, of whom 94% were tortured or severely abused, according to
a large interview study.[69]
Copher gave a
feeling for this style of diffuse data collection on terrorists in Turkey a
couple of decades ago.[70]
...We
[American liaisons] were called when major terrorist arrests were made and we
sat in.... We did not need to be present in the room but we were in the facility
and monitored all of it. Often we
suggested that the person be pulled out of the session and brought to us. We then started when it became clear the
individual was a terrorist....
. ..If [the locals told
us] the subject went to “donkey heaven” [i.e., died under their interrogation],
I would say, “It was already written by Allah,” and get on with the next truck
load of subjects. When a nation
declares martial law, all the interrogators go into high gear and work until
exhausted and then some....[Y]ou can conduct five or six normal-level interviews
and suddenly you have a “holding pen” of several thousand
people....
As
a prototype to guide a torture interrogation program, the time scale of the
ticking bomb scenario is extremely misleading. In FBI experience, deterrence of terrorist acts is a long-term affair,
with informants, electronic surveillance networks, and undercover agents. Operations must be tracked and allowed
to play out almost to the last stage to comprehend their scope.[71] The fanatics, martyrs, and heroes
scenario errs, like the ticking bomb scenario, in its focus on key
terrorists. They are difficult to
apprehend and likely to require great exertions from torturers. Their numerous peripheral associates are
much easier to apprehend and more susceptible to interrogation—whence the
inevitable trend towards the dragnet interrogation model of knowledge
acquisition. Among the detainees
will be many innocent or ignorant persons but these, too, are critical for
comparison of nonterrorist with terrorist data. The difficulty “from a purely
intelligence point of view,” as noted by Horne, is that “more often than not the
collating services are overwhelmed by a mountain of false information extorted
from victims desperate to save themselves further agony.”[72]
This is all to
say that while torture of terrorist suspects indeed provides more data, it does
not discriminate between truth and lies.
Turning to the related criminological studies, truth and lie detection
falls into a conflicted area.
Contemporary police interrogation manuals provide time-tested schemas for
truth and lie detection by eminent practitioners in the criminal justice
system. Manuals discriminate truth
tellers from liars through numerous verbal and nonverbal behaviors, often linked
to involuntary physiological responses.[73] Partly contradicting this literature of
interrogation expertise, experimental studies find that the short-term success
rate of professional lie catchers—police officers, detectives, prison guards,
customs officers, and the like—falls mostly in the 45% to 60% range, where 50%
is the chance rate. In these
experiments, professional lie catchers only differ from nonprofessionals in
their high level of confidence! The
professionals’ unwarranted confidence has been traced to lack of feedback in the
workplace regarding the accuracy of their judgments and to their false reliance
on behavioral signs of deceit, such as gaze aversion. In fact, behavioral signs of deceit
differ across liars and constitute only a small effect. Accuracy of lie detection has been
raised to the 70% to 85% level through arduous technical methods, such as film
analysis of micro-facial expressions, content analysis of testimony, polygraphy
by independent examiners, etc. Yet
even these methods can be counteracted by trained subjects[74]
or may fail due to individual differences.Ï[75] Torture, which exaggerates physiological
variability in subjects, may complicate objective lie
detection.
Because
of the large number of detainees and the weak discrimination between the guilty
and the innocent, dragnet interrogation requires much coordination between
torture interrogation units and (a) the police, (b) the judiciary, and (c) the
larger military institution and government. I examine in turn these facets of an
official torture interrogation program.
Coordination
of a Torture Interrogation Program with the Police
The U.S. "war on
terrorism" has driven into close cooperation previously separated, or even
estranged, police, FBI, CIA, and military intelligence agencies. As of October 2002, the 18,000 police
agencies, with 800,000 officers, vastly outnumbered the other agencies, for
example, the 27,000 FBI agents, 58% of whom work abroad.[76] Because of their numbers, networks,
jurisdictions, and the urgency of action, in any torture interrogation program
the police will be at the forefront of detention and interrogation of terrorist
suspects. Indeed, cross-national
studies have found that expertise in torture typically passes from the police to
military intelligence services.[77]
What proportion
of ignorant or innocent suspects are likely to be interrogated under
torture? Modern crime statistics
indicate that among suspects arrested and charged with serious crimes, one-half
to three-quarters are not convicted, depending on the state of jurisdiction.[78] Under the proposed torture interrogation
program, a detainee firmly believed to be involved in serious acts of terrorism
will likely be tortured. The
secrecy and urgency of terrorist cases certainly cannot improve the rate of
accuracy over serious criminal convictions, for the counterterrorist program
rejects normal judicial safeguards—the right not to testify against oneself, the
right to legal counsel, habeas corpus, bail setting, public hearings, and so
on. Moreover, in tracking terrorist
operations it is customary to interrogate individuals just because they are
acquainted with a person who has been detained, not because they are suspected
of crimes.[79] So an error rate of one-half to
three-quarters of torture interrogees would be a low estimate. For a long historical comparison,
examination of court records for 625 cases of torture interrogation in France,
from the 1500s through the mid-1700s, showed approximate rates of error—that is,
no confession on the rack, under repeated drowning, crushing of joints, and the
like—in 67% to 95% of cases, depending on the province.[80]
One source of
error is the nondescriptness of most terrorists. In search of terrorist profiles, a 1999
government report on The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism synthesized
dozens of cross-cultural empirical studies. Contrary to stereotypes, the report
concluded that terrorists are “practically indistinguishable from normal people”
in terms of outward appearance, they do not have “visibly detectable personality
traits that would allow authorities to identify a terrorist,” they are not
“diagnosably mentally disturbed”—except for an occasional psychopathic or
sociopathic top leader. Terrorist
organizations weed out the
conspicuous and the mentally ill as liabilities.[81]
How will the
counterterrorist program uphold a monopoly on the use of torture? Investigators of many other
crimes—narcotics trafficking, serial murder, sabotage of information systems,
espionage, financial scams....— will consider their own pursuits compelling,
some at the level of national security.[82] Both U.S. and British judiciaries have
struggled for decades with the overwhelming ill consequences of coercive
interrogation of suspects, which include false confessions and false testimony;
police deception and manipulation of courts; failure of systems of oversight;
and involvement of organized crime.[83] The 1956 Miranda rights for suspects in
the U.S. and the 1986 Police and Criminal Evidence Act in Britain[84]
stipulate conditions of fair interrogation and (in principle) require judges to
reject all but demonstrably voluntary confessions.[85] On the whole, analyses of subsequent
police interrogations have found negligible change in percentage of valid
confessions.[86] For reliability, professional police
practice leans toward “extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful
investigation”[87]
and away from confession evidence with its epistemic, ethical, and practical
problems.[88]
A U.S. program of
torture interrogation engenders the monumental task of discriminating between
terrorist and nonterrorist criminal suspects, in spite of many overlapping
criminal activities, and restricting torture interrogation to key
terrorists. Yet police departments
are still struggling to transform a history of counterproductive coercive
interrogation into a modern professional practice of efficient and accountable
interrogation.
Coordination
of a Torture Interrogation Program with the Judiciary
Intelligence
agencies around the world strongly resist interference from the judiciary and
attorneys, who are often perceived as politically liberal, uninformed,
infiltrated by the opposition, or, in any case, security risks for sensitive
operations. The Argentine General
Acdel Vilas, who was active in counterinsurgency operations in the early 1970s,
afterwards described how he circumvented judicial procedures. He sent out plainclothesmen instead of
uniformed officers to pick up suspects and passed only the insignificant
suspects into the justice system.
The plainclothes approach, however, jeopardized his officers, and he had
to cover for their deaths in irregular circumstances.[89] Similarly, General Aussaresses wrote of
an important terrorist who refused to confess: “...I’m convinced he won’t say a word
[under torture]. If there were to
be a trial and he hasn’t confessed, he could actually walk away free, along with
the entire FLN cadre. So let me
take care of him before he becomes a fugitive...” Aussaresses himself hung the terrorist,
as a weakly staged suicide.[90] The Israeli Supreme Court found that
interrogators from the General Security Service (GSS) routinely gave false
testimony about coerced confessions to conceal its methods from terrorists, to
secure convictions where evidence was lacking, and simply because false
testimony succeeded. GSS
interrogators insisted that they only lied in cases of actual guilt, and, “[o]ne
cannot clean sewers without dirtying oneself.”[91] In the British criminological
literature, this is called “noble cause corruption”: self-sacrificing agents falsify cases
and perjure themselves in court to convict people they believe to be
criminals.[92] Nevertheless, both British and Israeli
security services have been shamed by notorious cases of the conviction of
innocents after coerced confessions, false testimony by interrogators, and
contrived evidence. [93]
What about judicial monitoring of
a torture interrogation program?
The U.S. judiciary, with its publicly elected and politically appointed
judges, is not designed to hold its own against intelligence agencies,
especially in matters of national security. Dershowitz has proposed legalization of
torture in ticking-bomb cases by requiring "torture warrants" judges, by analogy
with search warrants.[94] But the ticking bomb scenario itself
does not afford judicial consideration of torture warrants for specific
individuals on specific occasions.
A former Brazilian police officer explained: “It is necessary to get the
information now because from now on to the future it might be too late. And to save time, everything is
valid.”[95]
Within intelligence
agencies, concealment of security operations is a professional virtue, not a
moral flaw.[96]
A colleague’s obituary for Richard Helms, former Director of
Central Intelligence, praised him “for standing up to the pressures” of a 1977
Senate investigation “to betray secrets that could be damaging to the
country.”[97] Intelligence professionals in the field
are usually more skillful in methods of concealment than those dispatched to
monitor them. Copher provided an example:[98]
[E]very
other year an inspector would stop by and ask what we all would do if ordered to
eliminate a foreign national. We
would all say, “report them as per regulations.” Then the inspector would leave. Then what we were told to do was often
in conflict with this idea. In
Lebanon we put our pro-U.S. warlord in charge and with the help of Shiites in
Iran, [the foreign national] was assassinated.
The consequentialist
moral rationale for torture interrogation of terrorists provides no plausible
mechanism for coordinating interrogators with the judiciary but would seem to
support interrogators’ idealistic motivations to present false testimony in
court and to thwart oversight. A
legal analysis of Israeli torture in the Occupied Territories concluded that in
a liberal democracy torture subverts the rule of law and erodes other democratic
ideals supported by the rule of law.[99]
Accommodation
of a Torture Interrogation Program within the Military and the
Government
Rood reasoned
from historical examples that, like the Nazi Deaths Head SS, an elite torture
interrogation corps would be isolated from the regular military and
intelligence. Its commander would
inevitably gain special powers, and his elite corps would have a destabilizing
effect on the military and government.[100]
Illustrative of
destabilization of the military, under the leadership of several generals the
Brazilian military gradually eliminated torture between 1975 and 1986 to save
itself as an institution. With
counterterrorist agencies
working outside the law, torturers graded into “smugglers, blackmailers, and
extortionists, and no one dare[d] to stop them.” Torturers scorned and controverted the chain of
command, creating two factions and destabilizing the army.[101]
Illustrative of the destabilization of government, near the end of
his life President Franklin Roosevelt commissioned a study that advised
disbanding the Office of Strategic Services—the World WarII covert
operations agency whose only rule was to win[102]—so
as to preclude a “‘post-war Gestapo.’”[103] Illustrative of the risk of excessive of
powers, in 1962 the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff considered framing Cuba for a
terrorist campaign on America, as a pretext for invading Cuba.[104]
Military wisdom
cautions that the long-term potential of a weapon or tactic is more important
than its initial purpose.[105] Regardless of the initial purpose,
resources invite new uses and are adopted by new users, as demonstrated by the
spread of atomic weapons. To this
point, a recent issue of the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin
expressed concern that "The Patriot Act" approved by Congress on October 26,
2001, would "expand the definition of ‘terrorist’ to include non-violent
protesters at an anti-war rally."[106] Indeed, such a strategic expansion of
the target group occurred under the Alien Enemy Act in World War II. The incarceration of 7,000 German
Americans partly resulted from a policy of arbitrary arrest to intimidate the
German American community as a whole.
The deportation of 4,000 Latin Americans of German ancestry to U.S.
internment camps partly resulted from their utility for prisoner exchange with
the Germans and from local greed for their properties.[107] The FBI and Bureau of Justice labeled
people of German ancestry “potentially dangerous” on the basis of unverified
accusations by neighbors, friends, business competitors, disgruntled employees, and the like.[108] Under the currently proposed torture
interrogation program, such detainees would be in line for torture as well as
incarceration.
The larger
institutional theme here is the difficulty of embedding a specially empowered
domestic program of torture interrogation, with high secrecy, into a political
system equilibrated by competing institutions. In a national security framework,
police, judicial, military, and government authorities are unprepared to check
the excesses toward which the mandate and tools of a torture interrogation unit
easily lead, according to both historical record and rational institutional
processes. Restated by a U.S. Army chaplain, “We just cannot go
there. It would change our national
identity.”[109]
IV. Rogue Models of Truth Telling under
Torture
The grave,
unintended consequences of overt state-sponsored programs of torture
interrogation have made covert programs attractive. In the rogue models, torture is not
necessarily the causal factor in extracting the truth from captives but may be
emotionally, culturally, or historically inseparable from customary
tactics. Or torture may be one
tactic among many in a hit-or-miss approach permitted by lack of accountability
for errors.
One much
discussed rogue option is outsourcing to foreign intelligence services. In the Korean War, for instance, U.S.
troops commonly turned over North Korean spies to South Korean intelligence for
torture interrogation.[110] The Association of Former [U.S.]
Intelligence Officers acknowledged outsourcing in its October 21, 2001,
newsletter:[111]
[S]ince
Sept. 11, the CIA has arranged for 230 suspects in 40 countries around the globe
to be jailed and questioned. One
notable aspect of putting possible terrorists in the hands of foreign security
services is that [those] states ... use interrogation methods that include
torture and threats to family members.
The
loss of control over information and the creation of political debts discourages
this option though.
A second rogue
option is the discreet use of illegal, government-sponsored torture. Secrecy can be maintained through
plausible deniability; isolation of torture sites; expendability of torturers;
and initial recruitment of torturers trained elsewhere—abroad, in prisons, by
abusive families. A combat veteran,
Kenneth Kendall, combining his “guinea pig” experience at the Nevada Test Site
with his witness of torture interrogations by South Koreans, conjectured the means of concealment of
torture:[112]
Once
you’ve got what information you need, then—it’s hard to do—but go ahead and
finish killing them and erase them from existence, and then that would cover you
from the dilemma of having to admit that you did something like this. If there’s only a small number of people
involved that could ever get out and say anything, then you can insist that they
didn’t know what they were talking about.—“This guy sung his head off. We didn’t have to do nothing with his
wife and child. We don’t know where
they’re at.” This is probably what
I would advise, how this went and all.
Primarily based on my past experience.
Numerous
self-identified survivors of alleged government-sponsored torture—in such
self-help organizations as the Advocacy Committee for Human Experiment
Survivors-Mind Control (ACHES-MC), Stop Mind Control and Ritual Abuse Today
(SMART), SurvivorShip, and Citizens against Human Rights Abuses(Cahra)—would
agree with Kendall’s explanation.[113]
The “information
services” of domestic criminal enterprises offer a third rogue option. It is a truism of criminology that
organized crime supplies the goods and services for which there is strong demand
but no legal avenue for supply.
Narcotics, “snuff” films, child pornography, transplant organs, artifacts
from archeological sites, and illegal weapons are familiar examples. In World WarII, the U.S. Navy
turned to the Sicilian-American mafia for information about German U-boats off
the Atlantic seaboard and the invasion of Sicily.[114] Organized crime also runs “information
services,” which include torture interrogation.[115]
From an
organizational perspective, these three rogue options are attractive because the
services can be utilized according to need, with an elasticity difficult for
state bureaucracies. Moreover,
training, monitoring, silencing, and disposal of participants can be managed
with relatively little involvement or corruption of U.S. government institutions
because few official liaisons need be involved. The practical liability is the
difficulty in breaking off or limiting relationships with rogue collaborators,
on account of sensitive information held in “dirty hands.” In effect, terrorist
information is bought through long-term tolerance of political and criminal
wrongdoing, under the euphemism, “protection of sources and
methods.”
Consequentialists
may argue that society is better off legalizing and regulating torture because
it is impossible to prevent it.[116] But an official U.S. program of torture
interrogation could not eradicate rogue services. They would still serve to circumvent
ethical and procedural constraints on the official program. And they are independently maintained by
other political and criminal interests.
Summary
and Assessment of the Torture Interrogation Program
Returning now to
the proposed official program of torture interrogation, here is a rough schema
of notable inputs and outputs, according to causal model.
Notable
Inputs and Outputs of Programs of Torture Interrogation of
Terrorists
According
to Causal Model
I. The animal instinct model of truth
telling, for the ticking bomb scenario
Intended
inputs •
Terrorists with plans of mass destruction • Basic
torture techniques •
Ordinary police and military interrogators Unintended
inputs •
Medical personnel at interrogation sites |
Intended
outputs •
Fore-knowledge of plans of mass destruction •
Harmless terrorist prisoners •
Unharmed interrogators Unintended
outputs •
Schisms and resistance in the medical community •
Disabled and dead interrogees. |
II. The cognitive failure model of truth
telling, for fanatics, martyrs, and heroes
Additional
intended inputs •
Terrorists resistant to coercion •
State-of-the-art torture interrogation techniques • Teams
of highly trained torturers Additional
unintended inputs •
Biomedical research on torture techniques •
Establishment of torture interrogation unit(s) |
Additional
intended outputs •
General knowledge of terrorist operations and terrorist
psychology Additional
unintended outputs •
Inseparable mixtures of truth and lies regarding terrorist
plans •
Spread of technologies of torture to other nations and terrorist
organizations •
Opportunistic illegal, bio-medical research on human
subjects. •
Spread of technologies of torture, resistance, and detection to foreign
governments •
Ruination of torture personnel •
Terrorist infiltration of program |
III. The data processing model of knowledge
acquisition, for dragnet interrogations
Additional
intended inputs •
Terrorist suspects and possible associates •
Bureaucratic apparatus for comprehensive data management and
analysis. •
Police assistance •
Judicial oversight. Additional
unintended inputs •
Falsely detained persons with no terrorist involvement or
knowledge |
Additional
intended outputs •
Understanding of social process of terrorist organizations, with
actionable knowledge. Additional
unintended outputs •
Tortured non-terrorist prisoners and corpses. •
Opportunistic torture interrogation of other classes of prisoners and
political dissidents. •
Institutional degradation of the police. •
Institutional degradation of the judiciary. •
Institutional degradation of the military and
government. |
Policy studies
demonstrate that program success in balancing intended outputs against
unintended outputs depends on formal access by outsiders and on provisions for
independent evaluation studies.[117] A
criminological study of police interrogation methods over a 50-year
period concluded that “all police interrogations should be witnessed by
observers who are both independent of police and empowered to act on behalf of
suspects by preventing escalation of inherently coercive pressures.”[118] In the case of a torture interrogation
program, such a safeguard is
impossible for security reasons.
In my view, it
remains for consequentialist advocates of a practical U.S. interrogation program
to plan for social repair after the inevitable breakdowns of institutions and
community. In country after country
where national security threats drove torture of domestic enemies —South Africa,
Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, El Salvador, Guatemala, Ireland ...—human rights researchers have shown
the inadequacies of various attempts at social repair—the criminal trials, truth
commissions, reparations to victims, community mourning rituals, .... The great majority of bystanders
constitute an intractable element.
Their passivity facilitated the social breakdown but they cannot be held
accountable for the repair.[119] Another intractable element is the
disparity between repair policies effective at the state level and policies
effective at the individual level.
A victim group accused the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission of “‘reconciliation showbiz’,” for substituting disclosure of
wrongdoing for prosecution of
wrongdoers.[120] The National Association of Radiation
Survivors accused the 1993 U.S. President’s Advisory Committee on Human
Radiation Experiments of “giving
the government what the government paid them for”—a cover-up job.[121] When grievances, such as torture of
nonterrorists, cannot be remedied by the state, scapegoating, cover-up,
discrediting of victims, and token reparations easily emerge as fraudulent
social repair tactics.
The
counterargument, of course, is that in a society destroyed by terrorism there
will be nothing to repair. That is
why the actual causal mechanism of torture interrogation in curtailing
terrorists must be elucidated rather than presumed. A criminological analysis of 500 British
court cases found that police interrogation of defendants contributed little to
discovery and conviction. Rather,
the study concluded that interrogation fulfilled certain psychological and
administrative needs and that “police perceptions of reality dominate the
criminal process.”[122] Unless the question of efficacy of
torture interrogation of terrorists is settled, advocates are liable to the
charges of making excuses for inflicting suffering on others[123]
and imposing torture for social control.[124]
The historical
record is not entirely clear but suggests that initial gains from torture
interrogation are later lost through mobilization of moral opposition, both
domestically and internationally, and through demoralization or corruption of
the torturers and their constituencies.
In a final assessment of the efficacy of the French torture campaign in
Algiers, Horne wrote: "the
stunning, cumulative impact it had was materially to help persuade public
opinion years later that France had to wash her hands of the sale guerre." Winning the Battle of Algiers meant
losing the war.[125]
Conclusion
Alan Dershowitz
closes his essay on “Torture of Terrorists” with this challenge:[126]
Had
law enforcement officials arrested terrorists boarding one of the airplanes [of
the September 11 disaster] and learned that other planes, then airborne, were
headed toward unknown occupied buildings, there would have been an
understandable incentive to torture those terrorists to learn the identity of
the buildings and evacuate them.
I
would like to close my essay with a reply.
The
individual law enforcement officials, of course, can make their own moral
choices and take their own risks.
But if it is state policy to torture the terrorist, then the policy
should be rational and the torture interrogation proceed with a reasonable
chance of success.
Terrorists
selected for such a role—like most American POWs in North Vietnam—can probably
stand up to commonplace tortures from untrained staff for a long time. The use of sophisticated techniques by a
trained staff entails the problematic institutional arrangements I have laid
out: physician assistance; cutting
edge, secret biomedical research for torture techniques unknown to the terrorist
organization and tailored to the individual captive for swift effect; well
trained torturers, quickly accessible at major locations; pre-arranged
permission from the courts because of the urgency; rejection of independent
monitoring due to security issues; and so on. These institutional arrangements will
have to be in place, with all their unintended and accumulating
consequences. Then the terrorists
themselves must be detected while letting pass without torture a thousand other
criminal suspects or dissidents, that is, avoiding a dragnet interrogation
policy.
The moral error
in reasoning from in the ticking bomb scenario arises from weighing the harm to
the guilty terrorist against the harm to the prospective innocent victims. Instead, the harm to innocent terrorist
victims should be weighed against the breakdown of key social institutions and
the state-sponsored torture of many innocents. Stated most starkly, the damaging social
consequences of a program of torture interrogation evolve from institutional
dynamics that are independent of the original moral
rationale.
Acknowledgments
For
conversations, correspondence, and interviews with former and active military
professionals, I thank: William
Casebeer, Barak Cohen, Paul Copher, Ernest Garcia, Kenneth Kendall, Tony Pfaff,
and Harold William Rood.
For responses to
my query on the intelligence list-serves of Cass Publishers’ Intelforum
(http://www.intelforum.org/) and the Association of Former Intelligence
Officers (http://www.afio.com), I
thank: Robin Bhatty, Drake Currie,
Mike Dravis (moderator), Harlan Girard, Stephen Godjas, Brendan Howley, Howell McConnell, Bill
Oliver, Pauletta Otis, Lewis Regenstein, Richard Thieme, Allen Thomson, Douglas
Vaughn, Nigel West, and Mike Yared.
For responses to
my query on the list-serve Ask-a-Philosopher, sponsored by Sheffield University
for the International Society of Philosophers (http://go.to.ask-a-philosopher‚ I
thank: Sean Allen-Hermanson, Steven
Bullock, Anthony Flood, Hubertus Fremery, Geoffrey Klempner (moderator), Derel
Dov Lerner, Harry Lesser, Gerald Marsh, Matthew del Nevo, Michael Neumann, and
Duncan Richter.
For
review of the manuscript, I thank John Crigler.
NOTES
[1]. Solomon, Alisa. (2001, December 4). The case against torture [Electronic
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[2]. McLaughlin, Abraham. (2001, November 14). How far Americans would go to fight
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[3]. Based on 1560 votes.—Crimeweek Daily
[On-line:
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[4]. Dershowitz, Alan M. (2002, January 22). Want to torture? Get a warrant [Electronic version]. San Francisco Chronicle, p.
A-19.
[5]. Rawls, John. (1955). Two concepts of rules. The Philosophical Review, 44 (1), 3-32.—
No one is proposing torture of all terrorist suspects in urgent situations, so
act utilitarianism rather than rule utilitarianism is at stake
here.
[6]. Mazmanian, Daniel, & Sabatier,
Paul. (1989). Implementation and public policy (2nd
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[7]. Hoffman, Bruce. (2002, January). A nasty business. The Atlantic Monthly, pp. 49-52. P. 52.
[8]. duBois, Page. (1991). Torture and truth. London: Routledge. Pp. 50, 51, &
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[9]. Hansen, Suzy. (2002, September 12). Why terrorism works [Interview with Alan Dershowitz]. Retrieved November 18, 2002 from
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[11]. An historical overview and bibliography
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[22]. Copher, Paul. (2003, January 13 & February
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communications.
“My team had nothing to
do with the Nalan Gurtas fiasco except to try to persuade the TNP not to harm
her as she was present at the assassination of four Americans....I told the
locals that the US needed to talk to her after she had some time to calm
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31-40. Pp. 31-32, & 35.—Of 6658 American POWs,
3323 were repatriated. “Most of the
remaining POWs died in captivity, largely in the early phases of the war, before
the Chinese Communists began their planned program of exploitation.” P. 31.
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[36]. These captured personnel are very
valuable assets to our job in the region.
We depend on them to keep us up to date, so killing themoff was not a
good thing....That is why we tried as hard as we could to get the person on our
side, to try various methods to convince them we might be able to help [them] if
they would come clean.—Copher, Paul.
(2003, February 17).
[37]. Garcia, Ernest. (1997, March 1). Personal communication.—“There were
times when I would actually go inside and sleep inside of the cell where they
were being held, and sit there with them, and I could pump more information than
anybody could pump under force or pain....What you do is first you work on their
confidence, gaining their confidence.
You make them believe that you're in the same boat that you are. That you yourself have been a victim of
the world. And tell them how
dissatisfied you are with the system.
It's very easy to do that because you're actually dissatisfied with the
system....”
[38]. Maio, Giovanni. (2001). History of medical involvement in
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The Lancet, 357 (9268), 1609-1611.
[39]. Hinkle served as President of the
American Neurological Association and President of Cornell University, among
many honors.
[40]. U.S. Senate, Select Committee on
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on Human Resources. (1977). Project MKULTRA: the CIA's program of
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Washington, DC: U.S.
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Pp. 7, 12-13, 123, &
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[41]. Weinstein, Harvey
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scientific research: A social
psychological and epistemological inquiry.
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Claremont Graduate University. P. 357.
[44]. Executive summary: Farwell Brain Fingerprinting. Retrieved December 23, 2002, from the
Lawrence A. Farwell web site:
http://www.brainwavescience.com.—Paul Copher contributed this
example.
[45] Copher, Paul. (2002, December 23, & 2003, February
17). Personal
communications.
[46]. Qouta, Samir, Punamaki, Raija-Leena,
& Sarraj, Eyad El. (1997). P. 26.
[47]. N. Zeeberg, "Torture—A Public Health
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[48]. Heinz, Wolfgang S. (1993). The military, torture and human
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[49] Amnesty International. (2000). Stopping the torture trade. New York: Author. P. 34.
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One such scientist was
MKULTRA psychiatrist Ewen Cameron.—Weinstein, Harvey M. (1990). Psychiatry and the CIA: Victims of mind
control.
[51]. U.S. Senate, Select Committee on
Intelligence and Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research of the Committee
on Human Resources. (1977). Project MKULTRA: the CIA's program of
research in behavioral modification.
Advisory Committee on
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Experiments. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office.
[52]. Arrigo, Jean Maria. (1999). Sins and salvations in clandestine
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[53]. Drogin, Bob, & Meyer, Josh. (2002, April 2). Detainee is bin Laden Aide; "He knows where people are." Los Angeles Times, pp. A1 & A6. P. A6.
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[55]. Heinz, Wolfgang S. (1993). The military, torture and human
rights.
[56]. Allodi, F. (1993). Somoza's National Guard: A study of human rights abuses,
psychological health and moral development. In F. D. Crelinsten & A. P. Schmid
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[57]. Cohen, Stanley, & Golan Daphna. (1991). The interrogation of Palestinians during
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"moderate physical pressure" or torture?
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[58]. Crelinsten, Ronald D. In their own words: The world of the torturer. In F. D. Crelinsten & A. P. Schmid
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[59]. Horne, Alistair. (1977). A savage war of peace: Algeria 1954-1962. London: Macmillan. P. 206.—Alistair refers to "numerous
cases like that of the European police inspector found guilty of torturing his
own wife and children, which he explained as resulting from what he had been
required to do to Algerian suspects...."
[60]. Heinz, Wolfgang S. (1993). The military, tortue and human
rights. P.
98.
In American military
history, members of the Office of Strategic Services, with its “dirty tricks”
that mainly fell short of torture, often experienced the contempt of the regular
army. —Moon, Tom. (1991). This grim and savage game: OSS and the beginning of U.S. covert
operations in World War II. Los
Angeles, CA: Burning Gate
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[61]. McNair, Rachel M. (2002). Perpetration-induced traumatic
stress: The psychological
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CT:
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[62]. Copher, Paul. (2002, December 16). Personal
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[63]. Arrigo, J. M.. (1999). P. 346.
[64]. Clark, Roy. (2000). Informers and corruption. In Billingsley, Roger, Nemitz, Teresa,
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[66]. Aussaresses, Paul. (2002). The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in
Algeria 1955-57. New York: Enigma.—Robin Bhatty contributed this
example.
[67]. Horne, Alistair. (1977). A savage war of peace: Algeria 1954-1962. London: Macmillan.
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confessions, and testimony.
[69]. Biletzi, Anat. (2001) The judicial rhetoric of morality: Israel's High Court of Justice on the
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Unpublished paper.
Occasional Papers of the School of Social Science, No. 9. Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv
Israel. P. 8.—Interviews were
conducted with 700 Palestinian interrogees. Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin himself
admitted that 8,000 had been subjected to violent shaking.
[70]. Copher, Paul. (2003, January 7 & February
17). Personal
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[71]. McGee, Jim. (2001, November 28). Ex-FBI officials criticize tactics on
terrorism: Detention of Suspects
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[72]. Horne, Alistair. (1977). A savage war of peace. Pp. 204-205.
[73]. E.g., Gordon, Nathan J., & Fleisher,
William L. (2002). Effective interviewing and interrogation
techniques. San Diego: Academic
Press.—The parasympathetic nervous system “decreases thoracic activity” (e.g.,
slows heart rate) and “increases abdominal activity” (e.g., stimulates
digestion). The sympathetic nervous
system “increases thoracic activity” (e.g., increases respiration rate) and
“decreases abdominal activity” (e.g., inhibits waste elimination.” Pp. 19-20.
Zulawski,
David E., & Wicklander, Douglas, E.
(2002). Practical aspects of
interview and interrogation (2nd
edn.). Boca Raton, FL: CRC.—Photo
captions: “Untruthful individuals
might posture themselves in a slumping position, extending their legs toward the
interviewer” (p. 130); “Truthful individuals generally hold their heads upright”
(p. 143).
[74]. Vrij, Aldert. (2000). Detecting lies and deceit: The
psychology of lying and the implications for professional practice. Chichester, UK: Wiley. Pp. 74-76, 96, 159.—Note: Among professional lie-catchers, Secret
Service members do a little better, and there are rare individuals with high
accuracy in lie detection.
“[S]ome professional
polygraph examiners claim an accuracy rate of 97% or above, whereas the
scientific evidence indicates a more modest accuracy of about
85%....”—Gudjonsson, Gisli.
(1992). P.
185.
[75]. Copher, Paul. (2003, February 17).—For example, moral
indignation may cause a false positive response if the polygrapher accuses the
subject of a particularly offensive crime.
“I would never depend on a polygraph for anything,” said
Copher.
[76]. Bowers, Faye. (2002, October 8). The intelligence divide: Can it be bridged? The Christian Science Monitor. Pp. 2 & 3.—Statistics quoted from
FBI Director Robert Mueller.
[77]. Heinz, Wolfgang S. (1993). The military, torture and human
rights. P.
81.
[78]. Huff, C. Ronald, Rattner, Arye, &
Sagarin, Edward. (1986). Guilty until proved innocent: Wrongful conviction and public
policy. Crime & Delinquency, 32
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523.
[79]. Crelinsten, Ronald D. In their own words. P. 61.
[80]. Silverman, Lisa. (2001). Tortured subjects. P. 182.—I interpret the error rate
within their own belief system.
[81]. Hudson, Rex A. (1999). The sociology and psychology of
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2003, from the Federal Research Division web site:
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[82]. E.g., “[I]f due process is
systematically denied to accused al-Qaeda members, one likely consequence is
that other categories of accused persons—drug dealers, mass murderers, child
molesters, etc.—will be labeled as similarly undeserving.”—Neier, Aryeh. (2002, February 14). The military tribunals on trial. The New York Review of Books,
11-15. P. 14.
[83]. As a methodological detail, police
distinguish between the forensic interview of a person who may have knowledge of
a crime, with the intent of gathering information, and the interrogation of a
suspect, after guilt has been established, with the intent of securing a
confession.The ideal interview is portrayed as nonaccusatory and free-flowing,
and the interviewer speaks only 5% of the time. The ideal interrogation is accusatory
and manipulative, and interrogator speaks 95% of the time. —Gordon, Nathan J.,
& Fleisher, William L.
(2002). Effective
interviewing and interrogation techniques.
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P. 29.
[84]. Gudjonsson, Gisli. (1992). The psychology of confessions,
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[85]. Gudjonsson,
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Skolnick, Jerome H.,
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force. New York: Free Press.
[86]. E.g., Pearse, John, & Gudjonnson, Gisli,
H. (1996). Police interviewing techniques at two
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[87]. Fricks, Richard Lawayne. (1997). Criminal confessions: Scriptural basis
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14.
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87.
[90]. Aussaresses, Paul. (2002). The Battle of the
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[91]. Gur-Arye, Miriam. (1989). Excerpts of the Report. Symposium on the report of the
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[92]. Gudjonsson, Gisli. (1992). The psychology of interrogations,
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Pp. 269 &
272.
[93]. For a British example, see the
“Birmingham Six” in: Gudjonsson, Gisli.
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[97]. Jonkers, Roy. (2002, November 18). In memoriam. Association of Former Intelligence
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[104]. Anderson, Russell. (2002). [Review of the book Body of
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6.
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xv.& xviii.
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Interview conducted via telephone by Jean Maria Arrigo, from Claremont,
CA, to
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354.
[113]. Judging from newsletters and personal
communications with members.
ACHES-MC, 363 Pearl St., #2, Thunder Bay, Ontario, P7B1E9;
http://www.aches-mc.org. SMART,
P.O. Box 1295, Easthampton, MA 01027; http://www.members.aol.com/SMARTNEWS. SurvivorShip, 139 Mission St., San
Francisco, CA 94110; http://www.survivorship.org. Cahra: http://www.dcn.davis.ca.us/~welsh/ —
primarily concerned with electro-magnetic resonance targeting of
civilians.
A weather station on a
military base in upstate New York, accessible only by helicopter, has been
mentioned as a covert torture interrogation site in the
1960s.
[114]. Campbell, Rodney. (1977). The Luciano Project: The secret wartime collaboration of the
mafia and the U.S. Navy. New
York: McGraw-Hill.—Based on the
1954 files of the New York State Commissioner of Investigations
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Harvey. (2002). Violence and social
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[120]. Hamber, Brandon, & Wilson, Richard
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[121]. Personal communication, May 8,
1997.
Task Force tells
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(1996, Winter) National
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Although not directed to
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20% of criminal cases.—Gudjonsson, Gisli.
(1992). P.
324.
[123]. A cognitive process called “moral
disengagement.”—Grussendorf, Jeannie, McAlister, Alfred, Sandstrom, Udd, Lina,
& Morrison,Theodore C.
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[124]. The Programme Coordinator of the
International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims in Copenhagen observes
that torture is very effectively used in well-functioning democracies "as a
means to keep an opposition quiet...."— Buhelt, Anders. (2001). Torture in well-functioning
democracies. [Book review of
Torture in the Basque Country, Report 2000, by TAT Group Against Torture.
(1999).] Torture, 11 (3),
92.
[125]. Horne, Alistair. (1977). A savage war of peace. Pp. 206-207.
[126]. Dershowitz, Alan M. (2002). Torture of terrorists: Is it necessary
to do and to lie about it? In
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477.